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FOREWARD 
Two years ago, before starting graduate school at UNH, I couldn't even imagine 
turning in a completed thesis. Granted: it's just a thesis, and likely no more than six 
people will read it. But for two years, this was more than the capstone to my graduate 
program. This was my Statement — my mark on the high-minded political science wall 
I'd come to know and respect. It had to be perfect. My variables had to be clearly 
defined; they had to do exactly what I wanted them to do; and my theory had to explain 
and describe exactly why. No other theory would suffice. 
Then reality set in. There is no perfect study: some variables are hard to define 
and they rarely do exactly what you want them to; and there is more than one way to 
describe and explain it all. "Don't reinvent the wheel," my thesis advisor said, again and 
again. "Just pick a theory and test it: if it works - great. If not, then you've added a little 
bit to the scholarly debate." It seems less scientific than it is practical. But it was a way 
out from what had become a set of lofty expectations for a novice political scientist. 
When the Hooding Ceremony came and went and a job offer was extended to me 
(God bless those alumni connections), it was clear to me and those around me that the 
time had come to get it done and move on. I was absolved of having to write the perfect 
thesis, and reminded that the best thesis is a done thesis. And so I got to work on the 
case-study - the put up or shut up. There, my theory would be undressed (or supported) 
by the facts, revealing how thin my argument was (or was not). Either way, the case-
study was the place I feared the most. 
The month of June was a blur. As John Mellencamp says, "Days turn to minutes 
and minutes to memories." But on the last day of the month, in the early hours of the 
morning, I finished. Later that morning, I pieced together the bibliography, finished the 
table of contents, and dashed to campus to print the whole thing off. Wasting paper never 
felt so good. Less than two weeks later, I defended this thesis, which to my elation was 
accepted pending only minor revisions. As one committee member put it, "you have 
your life to live." 
Submission of this thesis marks the unofficial end to two years of exciting, intense 
and scary, but always rewarding research done in political science, international affairs, 
foreign policy, and arms proliferation. I am ready to be called a "political scientist," a 
dated yet high-minded title in an era of editorial, subjective analyses cloaked in the soiled 
garments of an ostensibly objective news media. I am ready to be above it all. 
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ABSTRACT 
POST-COLD WAR RUSSIAN FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN 
By 
Matthew T. York 
University of New Hampshire, July, 2008 
Thesis Committee Chairman: Dr. Lawrence C. Reardon, Ph.D. 
Since 1989, Russia has armed and assisted Iran and other anti-Western states despite 
improved relations with the West, non-proliferation agreements, and United Nations 
sanctions. Such behavior apparently contradicts Russia's commitments to arms control 
and international security and stability. Thus, this study seeks to clarify this contradiction 
by conducting a crucial case-study of Russian military assistance to Iran from 2000 
through 2007. It applies interest-group theory and hypothesizes that from late-2000 to 
present day, interest groups successfully lobbied to increase defense-exports to Iran. It 
also applies interest-group theory to Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis of Russia's 
defense-export industry. Though insightful, Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical 
framework and a crucial case-study. Thus, in addition to determining the role of interest-
group lobbying in Russia's renewed Iran policy in 2000, this study also tests Blank's 
argument that Putin-appointees in the military-industrial complex (MIC) have pushed for 




During the Cold War, the United States of America (U.S.) and the Soviet Union 
provided foreign military assistance (FMA) to allies and non-state actors that were 
sympathetic to their own national interests and were inimical to those of their geopolitical 
rivals. Foreign military assistance to client-states in Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, 
and Latin America enabled both superpowers to support friendly governments, maintain 
military balances, support their military-industrial complexes (MIC), and assess their 
weapons' effectiveness under wartime conditions. It also allowed them to engage their 
rivals "by proxy" on foreign soil and without committing their nation's military. Thus, 
arming and training one's geopolitical allies was the preferred manner by which the 
superpowers engaged each other throughout the Cold War. 
However, since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation and the West -
specifically, the U.S. - have continued their Cold War practice of arming and assisting 
states that threaten each other's national interests and security. For example, the 
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) - itself a threat and an insult to Russia1 - has only exacerbated this trend.2 
Subsequently, the dilapidated Russian military now faces FSU republics in Eastern 
NATO expansion into the FSU not only threatens Russian territory, it may also base a disputed missile 
shield, which Russian officials argue would neutralize its ballistic missile forces — not Iran's. NATO 
expansion also reminds Russians who won and lost the Cold War. 
2
 NATO membership requires force-interoperability with other members. Thus, prospective FSU members 
are obliged to transition their military forces from Soviet-era arms and hardware to those of Western 
designs, a process from which the U.S. MIC has greatly benefited. 
1 
Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia that are armed with advanced, combat-proven 
arms provided by their old enemy, the U.S. For its part, Russia has supplied arms and 
assistance to its traditional client-states, like Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, which 
have been hostile to the U.S., its allies, and its interests abroad.3 It has also provided 
FMA to former U.S. client-states, notably Iran and Venezuela, which are now hostile to 
U.S. allies, interests, and security (if only rhetorically, in the case of Venezuela). 
What makes Russia's post-Cold War defense-export policy worthy of further 
analysis is that it has apparently continued its Cold War practice of arming and assisting 
anti-American, anti-Western regimes prior to or during conflict. For example, Kornet-E 
(NATO reporting name: AT-14 Spriggan) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), night 
vision goggles, Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers, and air-defense technicians 
were allegedly sent to Iraq just before, and employed against the March 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion.4 Such provisions violated UNSC Resolution 6875 and hindered coalition forces 
in the first few weeks of the conflict. Soviet and Russian technology form the backbone 
for North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, while Russian combat aircraft and small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) have found their way to Myanmar, Sudan, and other 
pariah-states. Most troubling is that, for nearly two decades, Russia has armed and assist-
ed the Iranian military as the Islamic Republic has defied inter-national calls to suspend 
uranium enrichment and fully disclose its nuclear activities. Such assistance — material 
and technical — could be used against U.S. and Western militaries should it be determined 
3
 Though, only Syria remains hostile to U.S. regional and national interests, and remains on the U.S. 
State Department's list of state-sponsor's of terrorism. 
Bill Gertz, Treachery: How America's Friends and Foes Are Secretly Arming Our Enemies (New 




that Iran's activities threaten regional and international security and must be neutralized. 
The Russia-Iran Case-Study at a Glance 
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been the world's second largest sup-
plier of conventional arms,6 but it has been Iran's primary supplier (see Figure 1), 
exporting a total of $4,665 billion through 2007. The People's Republic of China comes 
in second with $2,316 billion - slightly less than half of Russia's export volume. The 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Ukraine, and Poland come in 
third, fourth, and fifth, respectively. 
Figure 1: Sources of Iranian Arms Imports: 1989-2007 
Figure 1: Source, "TIV of arms imports to Iran, 1989-2007," Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (Stockholm), March 31, 2008, http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms trade/values.php (accessed June 25, 
2008). Note: Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in constant (1990) U.S. dollars. 
In terms of volume, Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation since 1989 has 
been erratic. Figure 2 (next page) shows the trend indicator value (TIV) of Soviet, and 
then Russian arms exports to Iran from 1989 through 2007 as report-ed by SIPRI. The 
data indicates the yearly volume - measured in 1990 U.S. dollars - of exported/imported 
6
 Though, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has led the world in conventional arms exports. 
3 
arms and military hardware. Foreign military assistance peaked in 1991 at $957 million, 
then dropped sharply to $220 million in 1992. It rebounded in 1993 to $564 million, then 
plummeted to $88 million in 1994. In 1995, it dropped further to just $42 million due to 
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and the subsequent halt on additional arms contracts. 
After a few years, trade volumes increased to $261 million in 1998, and ultimately to 
$342 million in 2000. They began to decline in 2001 - ironically, the first full year of 
renewed arms contracts. Thus, by 2002, arms volumes fell to $95 million and by 2004 
and 2005, they fell to $14 million each year. But several MTC contracts were signed in 
late 2005 and throughout 2006, sending volumes back up to $366 million - their highest 
since 1993. However, they fell to $214 million in 2007. 











1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
Figure 2: Source, "TIV of arms exports from USSR, 1989-2007" and "TIV of arms exports 
1992-2007," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 31, 2008. 
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Despite the variance in trade volumes, Moscow has had three discernible policies 
on military-technical cooperation with Iran since 1989: (1) the Open Sales policy (late-
1989 to mid-1995), (2) the "No New Contracts" policy (mid-1995 to late-2000), and (3) 
the Renewed Contracts policy (late-2000 to present). 
Between December 1989 and June 1995, Moscow provided extensive military-
technical assistance to Tehran, which, before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was a major 
ally and client of the U.S. and other Western nations. After the Revolution and through 
the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian military attempted to keep its Western, 1960s and 70s-era 
weapons in service — by illegally acquiring materials abroad and from manufacturing 
reverse-engineered copies at home. After the war, it began to overhaul its exhausted and 
largely obsolete military. Alienated from the West, Iran looked to the Soviet Union, and 
then Russia, for modern arms, which the cash-strapped country happily sold. Thus, from 
December 1989 through June 1995, Moscow sold anti-aircraft missiles, armored vehicles, 
combat aircraft, submarines, tanks, and domestic-production licenses to Tehran. Russia 
also helped to develop Iran's defense industry, missile and nuclear programs. 
But on June 30, 1995, Russian officials ceased signing new defense contracts with 
Iran. Under what would be dubbed the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, Russia would 
complete delivery of arms and services already under contract to Iran by the end of 1999, 
if the U.S. would launch commercial satellites on Russian rockets.7 Thus, between 1996 
and 1999, the fiscal value of Russian defense exports to Iran totaled just $200 million.8 
7
 Wade Boese, "Putin Reaffirms Arms Sales, Nuclear Assistance to Iran," Arms Control Today, April 2001, 
http://www.arniscontrol.org/act/2001__04/iran.asp (accessed March 16, 2007). 
8
 Boese, "Putin Reaffirms Arms Sales, Nuclear Assistance to Iran," 2001. 
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Despite this moratorium on new arms contracts, from 1998 through 2001, Russo-
Iranian military-technical cooperation increased to $300 million. In November 2000, 
Russia withdrew from the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and resumed arms sales 
to Iran, which began a month later. In March 2001, Russian and Iranian officials signed 
FMA agreements reportedly worth $6.7 billion.9 Thus, between 2002 and 2005, the 
financial value of Russia's arms sales to Iran increased nearly six-fold to $1.7 billion.10 
Later agreements have been signed, bringing billions of dollars in revenue to Moscow; 
advanced armaments to the Iranian military; and vital military-technical assistance in 
developing Iran's ballistic missile programs and military-industrial complex. 
Currently, Iran defies UN and U.S. demands to cease enriching uranium" and 
sponsoring terrorism in Iraq and Israel. It also threatens to attack Israeli cities and U.S. 
assets and disrupt the global oil supply if either attacks its nuclear facilities. Similarly, 
Russia has defied arms control regimes, like the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), and has abrogated bilateral agreements, like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agree-
ment, by arming and assisting Iran. Moreover, the possible sale of the S-300PMU-1 
(NATO reporting name: SA-20A Gargoyle A)12 and Pantsyr-SIE (SA-22 Greyhound)13 
9
 Tor Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in Russia's Iran Policy," Problems of 
Post-Communism 49 (November/December 2002): 29, 38. 
10
 Lionel Beehner, "Russia-Iran Arms Trade," Council on Foreign Relations, November 1, 2006, 
!lttril//www^cjfcorg/^ (accessed 15 March 2007). 
11
 Edmund Blair, "Iran Rules Out Halt to Sensitive Nuclear Work," Reuters, May 5, 2008, 
bttp:/7www.reuters.coni/article/newsMaps/ 
idUSBLA52198020080505?pageNuraber=l&virtualBrandChanncM) (Accessed June 16, 2008). 
12
 "Iran Shields Its Nuclear Activities by Russian Missiles," Kommersant (Moscow), December 27, 2007, 
http://www.kommersant.eom/p840222/i' 1/lran Air DefenseS-300/(Accessed March 13, 2008). 
13
 Jane's Defence Weekly Exclusive, "Iran to Acquire Advanced Air Defence System Via Syria," 
http://www.janes.com/press/features/pr070518 1 .shtml (Accessed July 29, 2008). 
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mobile air defense Systems could also put Russia in violation of UNSC Resolution 
1747.14 Adopted March 27, 2007, Resolution 1747 "calls upon member states to refrain 
from selling specific military materiel to Tehran," including missile systems.15 
What makes Russia's military-technical assistance to Iran problematic is that it is 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council — the world body tasked with upholding 
or restoring order vis-a-vis international crises. Yet, Russian assistance to Iran (and other 
problematic states) seems to defy both the spirit of and its role on the Security Council, as 
it rewards Iran's contentious, irresponsible behavior. It subsequently threatens Western 
militaries, as Russia's military-technical assistance has, in part, helped Iran develop a 
formidable offensive and defensive capability. Should fellow Security Council members, 
like France, the U.K., and the U.S. attempt to neutralize Iran's nuclear program, they will 
encounter 18 years of extensive Russian military-technical assistance. Russian officials 
are surely aware of this. Thus, one must ask, why does Russia arm Iran? 
By arming and assisting its anti-Western client-states during international crises, 
Russia not only condones and rewards aggressive, irresponsible behavior, it also 
perpetuates it. Moreover, some argue that Russia is engaging in the Great Power Games 
and power-politics of the Cold War, when arming the enemy of one's enemy was the 
preferred manner by which to hurt the enemy. But why would Russia continue with such 
a policy? Is this a continuation, or a resumption of the power-politics, proxy-wars, and 
zero-sum games of the Cold War? Or, is it something more typical of Russian domestic 
politics in the globalized, post-Cold War environment? 
15
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1747 (2007), 2007, Prepared by the United Nations Security 
Council [PDF] (New York, N.Y., 2007). 
7 
Broader Questions 
The Cold War ended nearly 20 years ago. Russia, the U.S., and the West are no 
longer ideological rivals; instead, they are complex, interdependent partners with shared 
security concerns who, ostensibly, have little use for Cold War-era power-politics. Yet, 
they apparently persist on both sides. Though this crucial case-study will analyze the 
reasoning behind and resumption of Russia's post-Cold War foreign military assistance 
to Iran in 2000, it will illuminate a broader question: are Russia and the U.S. engaging in 
post-Cold War power-politics via their defense exports? 
Overview of Thesis 
Chapter one will discuss a critical piece of literature written on post-Cold War 
Russian defense-export policy: Stephen J. Blank's Rosoboroneksport, the arguments of 
which this research will test. Because Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical framework, 
Chapter one will then discuss two predominant theories — state-autonomous and rational 
choice theories - as they relate to foreign policy questions. Specifically, it will cross-
examine the state-autonomous theory and the interest group theory of government in 
order to deduce the most applicable domestic-level theory for this case-study. It will 
arrive at the interest-group theory, and then seek to apply it to Blank's analysis of Putin-
era arms sales policy - particularly with regard to Iran. 
Chapter two will provide the methodological framework for this study. It will 
define the units and levels of analysis, and key variables. It will provide the argument's 
justifications, strengths, and weaknesses, and suggestions for further study of the topic. 
Chapter three will comprise the actual case-study. It will present a brief overview 
of arms and service agreements signed between the Soviet Union (and then Russia) and 
8 
Iran, beginning in December 1989 and continuing through June 1995. It will then survey 
goods and services provided to Iran - legally and illegally - through 1999, just before 
Moscow shifted policy vis-a-vis Iran. It will then examine both Western foreign policy 
institutes and Russian media sources from early 2000 to present day to measure (1) the 
role of Russian interest-group lobbying in Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation, 
and (2) their effects of their lobbying (i.e., rent-seeking). It will analyze the subsequent 
deals made in the context of Kremlin official statements, as well as regional and inter-
national developments, to determine approximately how much of a bearing those groups 
had. Though this study works at the domestic level and takes as its units of analyses 
domestic interest groups, it does not discount the role that international variables play. 
Thus, it will measure domestic variables while controlling for systemic variables. 
Finally, this study will present its findings. It will suggest alternative domestic-
level theories — such as corporate, elite, and rent-seeking theories — that future studies 
could apply to the same topic. It will also suggest alternate levels of analysis - notably, 
the international level — at which such studies could work. Because this study will work 
entirely at the domestic level, it does not vet individual or international-level variables, 
which many other studies have examined and have subsequently shown to contribute to 
Russia's post-Cold War military-technical relations with Iran. 
This study will also conclude with a list of policy recommendations which U.S. 
officials may use to discourage Russia's provision of advanced conventional arms to, and 
military-technical cooperation with Iran. The West's options are limited - though, they 
are worth exploring, particularly as Iran's nuclear and regional activities continue to be 
problematic, and the Russian defense industry tries to remain afloat. 
9 
CHAPTER I 
TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
As Peter Gourevitch states, "If nations have choices, we need theories and 
research that explains how countries make these choices."16 As a result, there are multiple 
theories on foreign policy at multiple levels of analysis — from the individual, to the 
domestic, to the regional, to finally the international level. But, without discrediting most 
theories and entire levels of analysis, this research will work at the domestic level and 
analyze the role of special interest groups in Russia's defense exports to Iran since 2000. 
Specifically, it will apply the interest-group theory of government to Stephen J. Blank's 
analysis of Russia's defense-export industry and policies under President Vladimir Putin. 
This research acknowledges that other scholars17 have analyzed such policies at the inter-
national level. It grants such systemic explanations, yet supplements them with a group-
oriented approach at the domestic level. 
First, this chapter will analyze Blank's argument, distil its main points, and high-
light its major weaknesses. Though groundbreaking and insightful, Blank's argument 
must be theoretically examined, as it lacks a theoretical framework. Thus, this chapter 
will then examine two opposing, yet potentially applicable domestic-level theories: 
Peter Gourevitch, "Domestic Politics and International Relations," Handbook of International Relations, 
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002): 310. 
17
 Such as Eugene Rumer, Brenda Schaffer, and Ze'ev Wolfson. 
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realism and rational choice theory. It will first offer a critique of Blank's argument using 
Stephen D. Krasner's two realist criteria for empirically-inducing the national interest: (1) 
distributed effect and (2) consistency. Failing such criteria, it will illustrate how 
realism's statist/state-autonomous theory is insufficient for describing and explaining 
post-Cold War Russian defense-export policy. This chapter will then move to the 
rational choice literature where it will induce a theoretical framework for this research. It 
will then arrive at the interest-group theory of government, which will later be applied to 
Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export policies and processes since 2000. 
Rosoboroneksport: Stephen J. Blank's Analysis 
Blank (2007) argues that since 2000, Russia's "conspicuous sale of weapons to 
states who are openly or potentially anti-American [e.g., Venezuela, Syria, Iran]"18 
represent "an increasingly adversarial policy towards the U.S."19 They are also zero-sum 
for Russia: they "strike at U.S. interests while simultaneously advancing its own."20 They 
"include obtaining a foothold in the target state's defense and foreign policies and acqui-
sition of revenues along with market share from these sales."21 Other authors, like Ze'ev 
Wolfson,22 have provided similar, multi-level explanations for Russia's defense-export 
policy. But unlike Wolfson, Blank analyzes the inner dynamics of the statist, top-down 
paradigm, and argues that this contentious arms-export policy has emerged along with 
Stephen J. Blank, Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry (Carlisle, 
PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 1. 
19






 Wolfson, "The 'Russian Factor' in the Military Balance in the Middle East." 
11 
"Russia's regression to an authoritarian, even autocratic system, a so-called 'managed 
economy.'"23 As such, arms are exported exclusively through Rosoboroneksport, 
Russia's lone, state-owned and -controlled defense-exporter managed by Putin loyalists. 
There are two tenets of Blank's argument: first, Rosoboroneksport "epitomizes 
much of the unique Russian state supervision of industry as a whole,"2 and second, it 
"represents the recrudescence of the tsarist or neo-Muscovite patrimony that survived 
both tsarism and the Soviet epoch where it appeared."26 Paraphrasing Grigory Yavlinsky, 
Blank states that, "the entire economy operates within a system of informal, shadow 
relationships, including a vast, equally informal government that must control or own all 
property through control over resources and the judiciary."27 Thus, "property rights are 
either non-existent or at best conditional upon service to the state."28 In return for their 
service, stewards are allowed to extract rents from the defense-export process in the form 
of bribes, corruption, kickbacks, and commissions.29 
Given such rent-seeking and granting among Putin's appointees - most of which 
hold stock, or executive positions within Russian defense companies — this paradigm 




 Notably Putin's colleagues from the security services who now direct Russia's commercial, economic, 
and political activities — the so-called Chekisty. 
25
 Ibid, 4. 
26
 Ibid, 5. 
27
 Ibid. A Russian economic and political figure. 
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their special interests. Thus, despite Putin's lofty claim that arms exports during his 
tenure are meant, in part,31 to further Russia's national interests, they have apparently 
fallen victim to myriad rent-seekers in and out of the Kremlin. 
In sum, Blank argues that Putin-era defense-export policy follows a Statist, top-
down paradigm which increasingly resembles neo-Muscovite, Soviet, and even tsarist 
models of state ownership, management, and elite-patrimony. By virtue of its structure, 
Russia's defense-export industry rewards elite functionaries for their loyalty to the State 
by permitting them to extract rents from the defense-export process. Though rent-
seeking and -granting occurred to varying degrees during the Yeltsin-era (i.e., in the form 
of companies lobbying for arms sales abroad, or conducting them in contravention of 
Russian policy), such activities during the Putin-era are fundamentally different. Here, 
elite patronage, rent-seeking, and unscrupulous business activities are bi-products of 
Putin's tenuous reward system; they are payment for advancing Russia's national interest. 
Ironically, such patronage, rent-seeking and rent-granting detract from Russia's national 
interests, while they further the various special interests in and out of the Kremlin. Thus, 
Russians might very well have traded one kleptocracy for another, more charismatic one. 
Weaknesses 
As insightful as Blank's argument appears, it has two critical pitfalls. First, Blank 
is unclear about why Putin has engaged in elite patrimony, and why his appointees are 
then allowed to seek rents. Is it because Putin is "taking care of his own" (they mostly 
' A colloquial Russian term for an unqualified bureaucrat or a political-appointee. 
Russia's energy industries — also state-owned and -controlled - are the other means by which Putin is 
trying to further Russia's national interests. 
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come from the security services), or because they helped Putin win the 2000 presidential 
election? It is a cliche in politics that "to the victor go the spoils." However, it may apply 
here. Since 2000, Putin has appointed colleagues and confidantes from the KGB, and its 
successors [the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SVR] in executive-level positions in both government and industry. As a result, Andrei 
Belyaninov, Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Victor Ivanov, and Mikhail Dmitriev have 
clearly benefited — financially and politically — from Putin's rise to power. 
It may also be that Putin's appointees in the defense industry and the so-called 
power ministries (siloviki) — members of his "winning coalition" — are being repaid for 
helping Putin win the presidency in 2000. Tor Bukkvoll (2003) argues as such, drawing 
on the winning coalition literature expounded by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James 
Lee Ray. He argues that in exchange for their support, Putin has included members in his 
close, inner policy-making circle while rewarding others with pure material payoff.33 
Coming full circle, Putin's patrimonial, rent-seeking system as characterized by Blank 
may be Putin's attempt to reward his "winning coalition." By extension, renewed arms 
contracts with Iran may ultimately be Putin's payoff to this coalition. 
Second, Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical framework and a crucial case-study, 
compelling this research to find a suitable theory to describe and explain Putin's defense-
exports to Iran and other pariah-states. This is no small task, as Blank describes and ex-
plains relationships between the state and society that, on the surface, resemble a statist, 
top-down paradigm. However, as the research digs deeper, it uncovers relation-ships that 
32
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suggest societal, bottom-up paradigms (i.e., bureaucratic, corporate, elite, interest-group, 
rent-seeking, and winning-coalition theories). Thus, the following section will examine 
these opposing theoretical bodies, starting with realism and moving to rational choice. 
Towards an Analytic Framework 
Realism: Statist, or State-autonomous theory 
Realists, notably Stephen D. Krasner, view the state as a viable, "autonomous 
actor"34 that is insulated from special-interest groups and sets policy independent from 
them. Krasner's seminal, realist critique of raw materials investments and U.S. foreign 
policy, Defending the National Interest, provides a statist theory (also known as the state-
autonomous; state-centric) for explaining and describing foreign policy.35 Under a statist 
paradigm, "the objectives sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of 
private desires."36 Instead, they are called "the national interest."37 
For Krasner, a state's strength vis-a-vis societal groups — "ranging from weak to 
strong"38 - determines how insulated it is from those groups,39 and ultimately how effect-
ively it advances its national interests. Most "capitalist or market-economy countries"40 
fall into one of "three ideal-typical relationships between the state and society:"41 weak, 
Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1978): 6. 
35
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moderate, and strong states. To some extent, all can advance their national interests 
because they all can resist private pressures. Unlike weak states, moderate states can 
change private behavior; however, they cannot change social structures. Only strong 
states can resist private pressures and change both private behaviors and social struc-
tures.42 Thus, strong states can more effectively advance their national interests. 
According to Krasner, a state's national interests can be determined by one of two 
methods: (1) Logical-Deduction, and (2) Empirical-Induction. As logical-induction is 
less consistently applicable to foreign policy issues than empirical induction, the latter is 
the preferred method. Using empirical-induction, "the national interest is induced from 
statements and behavior of central decision-makers. If their preferences meet two basic 
criteria, they can be called the national interest."43 First, policy-initiatives "must be 
related to general objectives [e.g., economic growth, national security, etc], not to the 
preferences or needs of any particular group or class, or to the private power drives of 
officeholders."44 Second, such policies "must persist over time."45 
Applying Krasner's First Criterion 
According to Krasner, policy must "affect the whole community"46 if it furthers 
the national interest. Also, "if there are gains from a policy, these must not always accrue 
41
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to a particular group or class,"47 while losses "must not always fall on a particular group 
or class."48 Lastly, "the preferences of central decision-makers must not be directed 
solely to their own personal interests, if they are to be termed the national interest."49 
Applying Krasner's first criterion to Blank's analysis of post-Cold War Russian 
foreign military assistance policy, the research reveals that the "gains" from the resulting 
sales (i.e., profits and revenues) have had little positive impact on Russia's economy or 
national security sectors (i.e., the defense industry and the military). Indeed, Russia's 
economic upturn owes more to the rise in energy prices since Putin took office than to its 
defense exports. Meanwhile, the defense industry struggles to procure modern, reliable 
arms50 - even for the export market.51 As a result, Russia's military continues to atrophy, 
as maintenance and manpower costs sap funds for modernization and procurement.52 
However, as Blank argues, there are several sectors of Russian society - notably, 
Rosoboroneksport (Russia's sole, state-owned defense-export company), the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD), and Kremlin actors, including Putin, himself - that, by design, benefit 
more from defense exports than the economy or the military. 
Since President Putin consolidated the defense-export sector in November 2000, 
most defense companies have exported arms, goods, and services through Rosoboron-
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from all sales and is obligated to transfer between 10 and 50 percent of export revenues 
to the federal budget.34 However, Blank cites data showing that in 2001 - Rosoboron-
eksport's first full year of operation — it had "transferred only 4 percent of its net income 
to the federal budget."55 The Russian Federation's Accounting Chamber not only cited 
"irregularities" in Rosoboroneksport's financial procedures, but also claimed that "the 
framework of its activity was so convoluted it defied meaning ful control."56 Such 
negligible revenue transfers and irregular accounting have impacted the state defense 
order. By November 2005 — five years after the creation of Rosoboroneksport — Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov, himself, admitted "that defense allocations were falling short of 
needs, with the Navy and Air Force particularly lacking in supplies."57 Thus, between 70 
and 80 percent of the Russian Military's equipment was viewed obsolete.58 
According to Blank, such malfeasance is nothing new to the Russian MIC. "It is 
well known that, for both President Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, the arms sales 
organization served as a slush fund by means of which unaccountable funds went straight 
to the President for unspecified political purposes."59 Moreover, "many of the funds that 
accrue personally to Sergei Chemezov, the director of Rosoboroneksport, and his key 
subordinates are equally untraceable. In return, these servitors must carry out policies 
53
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made atop the government machine."60 Thus, commissions, funds, and revenues "are 
merely among the more visible examples of rents accruing to key state players from the 
of weapons abroad."61 The more opaque examples include inter- and intra business 
governmental bribes, kickbacks, corruption, and financial and political favors secured by 
executives and governmental officials.62 
Thus, to increase Rosoboroneksport's efficiency, transparency, and ultimately its 
contributions to the state defense budget, Putin initiated three military-industrial reforms 
in 2004, one of which was to subordinate Rosoboroneksport beneath the Ministry of 
Defense.63 This move gave Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and his subordinates control 
over the defense-export industry and access to its profitable system of rent-seeking and 
granting.64 Moreover, with Ivanov now chairman of the board of directors of the United 
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) — a state-owned holding-company for all major Russian 
aerospace companies65 — he and his subordinates have an added financial incentive to 
push for arms exports abroad. As one analyst put it, "It would be like if Donald 
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In all, despite the stated goals of Russia's defense-export industry - economic 
growth and defense-industrial restoration67 - those directing or associated with industry 
are poised to benefit more than the economy, the defense industry, the military, or the 
state. Thus, Krasner's first criterion for inducing the national interest - policy affecting 
all, rather than some - does not apply to Blank's analysis of Putin-era defense-exports. 
Furthermore, this criterion is mutually exclusive, given the relationship between 
the defense industry and the state in capitalist economies. Regarding Russia's defense 
industry, even if it were to receive sufficient funds from arms exports and were to fulfill 
domestic defense orders, there would still exist a mutually beneficial relationship 
between itself and the state. But Russia is not a red herring; this is true of all defense 
industries in capitalist economies, where national security is a public service provided by 
private industry. However, while most state's defense industries further their special 
interests while advancing the national interest, according to Blank, Russia's defense 
industry furthers their special interests at the expense of the national interest. Thus, 
Krasner's first criterion - policy affecting all, not some - is not only inapplicable to 
Blank's analysis of Russia's defense industry, it is perhaps inapplicable to all cases 
involving domestic defense industries in capitalist economies. 
Krasner's Second Criterion 
Applying Krasner's second criterion for inducing the national interest - persistent 
policy-implementation — this research finds that Russia's defense-export policy vis-a-vis 
Iran has been inconsistent. It has gone through three distinct phases: open sales (Decem-




(December 2000 - present). As Krasner writes, "when confronted with a similar problem 
at a different time, leaders might choose another ordering of goals."68 Such ordering 
might "change from one administration to another,"69 but this "would not be consistent 
with the notion that" such a policy furthered the national interest. 
Moscow's military-technical cooperation with Tehran began in December 1989 
and increased through the mid-1990s. In June 1995, Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice-President Al Gore agreed that Moscow would halt signing 
further arms contracts with Tehran. It allowed arms and services under contract at the 
time of the agreement to continue, but required them to conclude by the end of 1999. 
Thus, while bilateral military-technical cooperation continued through 1999, it dipped 
sharply from 1995 through 2000. 
However, on November 3, 2000 - a day before Putin created Rosoboroneksport -
Putin abrogated the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and pledged to renew arms negotia-
tions with Iran. Then in March 2001, President Putin and Iranian President Mohammed 
Khatami signed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar agreement that renewed their bilateral 
relationship for the 21 s t century. Since then, Russia has transferred dozens of high-tech 
weapons platforms to Iran, including air defense systems, ground attack aircraft, and 
multi-role helicopters. It has also provided Iran with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, 
aircraft engines, and technical assistance in developing its domestic arms industry and 
modernizing its largely Western military. Thus, Russia's military-technical cooperation 
with Iran has been inconsistent. 
Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 44. 
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Also, Moscow has inconsistently defined its military-technical cooperation with 
Iran since it renewed in late-November 2000. That month, Andrei Nikolayev, Chairman 
of the State Duma Committee for Defence, stated that renewed MTC with Iran would 
"bring political advantages, above all,"70 but also noted that "Iran is a solvent country, 
which will be paying in cash."71 Similarly, General Anatoly Kvashnin, head of the Rus-
sian General Staff, stated that Russia would expand its MTC "with any countries if it 
benefits Russia, benefits its defensive capability, among other things." 
More recently, though, Russian officials have defined their MTC with Iran in 
strict geopolitical terms. At the February, 2007 Munich Conference on Security, Defense 
Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the sale of 29 Tor-Mi 
short-range air-defense (SHORAD) systems to Iran were "designed for the defence of 
that country."73 Similarly, Mikhail Dmytriyev, head of the Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), stated that their "mission is to protect a specific facil-
ity"74 - i.e., the Busheher nuclear power plant. Putin stated "We have done this so that 
Iran should not feel cornered or [sic] that is in some hostile surrounding and understand 
that he has a channel for communication and friends who can be trusted."75 
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In sum, there is much vacillation among statements made by top Kremlin officials 
regarding Russia's defense-export motives and policies - from general policy to specific 
deals with specific client-states. Such inconsistency further weakens the Statist claim 
that Russia's foreign military assistance policy serves the national interest - particularly 
since Russian officials are not in agreement about what interests they advance. Taken 
together - Russia's inconsistent post-Cold War defense-exports to Iran and the Kremlin's 
conflicting statements vis-a-vis such exports - this research finds that Russia's defense-
export policy fails Krasner's second criterion for inducing the national interest. Thus, 
if the goals of central decision-makers are transitory, shifting in importance 
from one case to another, a bureaucratic-politics or group-oriented approach 
would be more appropriate: these models predict vacillations in the prefer-
ences of governmental actors because the influence of different bureaus or 
societal groups changes from one issue to another.76 
In light of Krasner's recommendation, this research turns to rational-choice theory 
for its analytic framework. It will discuss the works of Marceau, LaPalombara, Schatt-
schneider, and Olson. It will build on Schattschneider's groundbreaking work on inter-
est-group theory and utilize Olson's conception of special-interest groups (sometimes 
called distributional coalitions), as well as how they operate within society. Olson's 
work is critical here because it will connect the interest-group literature to the rent-seek-
ing literature, just as Stephen J. Blank does in his analysis of Russia's defense-export 
industry. Paradoxically, this will allow the research to delineate between interest-group 
lobbying and the costs of such lobbying within Russia's defense-export industry - two 
different variables - which will help ensure internal validity for this study. 
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Rational Choice Theory: Interest-group theory of Government 
Unlike realism, which views the state as an autonomous actor and policy from the 
top down, rational choice theory's basic unit of analysis is the group and views policy 
from the bottom up. Policy is then viewed as a competition among various groups — 
bureaucratic, economic, political, social, and others.77 As a result, "Government institu-
tions merely process inputs and outputs."78 Also, rational choice theories - the interest-
group theory, in particular - treat the state as "a set of formal structures, not an autono-
mous actor. There is no cohesive center of decision-making."79 Thus, "the locus of 
power may move from one bureau to another, from one branch of government to another, 
depending on the interests and resources associated with particular issues."80 
The Interest-Group Theory of Government 
According to Oliver Garceau (1958), there has been an effort in the scholarly 
literature to create a broad theory which considers the group the central or sole building 
block in the political process81 and accounts for all resultant policy. "To do this, it is 
necessary in effect to give the group tag to many different kinds of social relationships 
and interactions."82 Garceau, and then LaPalombara (1960) note that "the trouble with 
this 'theory' is that the data from the field do not confirm it."83 As a result, scholars have 
77
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included not only interest groups in the model, but also the groups with which members 
associate (i.e., "reference groups"), and groups "that may, if put under stress, serve as the 
basis for organized political activity" (i.e., "potential groups").84 However, as Garceau 
notes, "The search for such a complete theory of the group basis of politics may be 
stretching too far for theoretical elegance"85 at the expense of "an analytical tool." 
Indeed, such a broad notion of interest-group theory makes for an awkward, bulky, and 
non-parsimonious theory that decreases in utility as it increases in scope. 
Thus, "we must see interest groups as parts of whole political processes"87 - as 
opposed to political processes, themselves. In other words, interest groups must be con-
ceived as singular actors in the democratic political process - along with the executive, 
judicial, and legislative branches, and the electorate — seeking to affect that process. On 
the strength of this more parsimonious theory, a number of key assumptions, concepts, 
and propositions regarding interest groups are evident, including: 
A. A group's influence vis-a-vis its competitors will vary with the propor-
tion of the total membership in its specialized area that it [can] organize. 
B. Although formal organization is not essential to an interest group, all 
other things being equal, organization is in itself an independent vari-
able affecting the degree of success a group can have in influencing 
decisions or policies. 
C. A group's ability to intervene efficaciously in governmental decisions 
affecting it varies directly with the nature of the group's access to 
decisional information. 
D. Bureaucratic agencies differ in the degree to which they are penetrable 
S3 Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest-Group Theory in Non-American Field 
Situations," Journal of Politics 22 (1960), 31. 
84





87 Ibid, 111. Italics mine. 
25 
by organized groups. Responsiveness to group demands will be maxim-
ized in those agencies that are newer and more functionally specialized. 
E. All other things being equal, decision makers will favor those group rep-
resentatives or negotiators who evidence life experiences (social origin), 
social class, education, etc.) similar to those of the decision makers. 
F. Interest groups will be ineffective in the degree to which the concept of 
the "public interest" is a strongly held myth by the governmental decis-
ion makers. 
G. Interest groups will be more active in public administrative areas in 
those countries displaying the highest degree delegated legislation. 
H. The administrative role, as such, limits the influence of interest groups 
because, like all roles, it involves required, permitted and forbidden 
behavior. 
I. The power of any sample of politically active groups (on any given ser-
ies of issues) will vary with a) the political "styles" of the groups, b) 
the reference groups of the bureaucrats, and c) the structure and proces-
ses of the bureaucracy.88 
Subsequent case studies that have applied interest-group theory to policy formula-
tion "have focused attention on nexus points of decision making where interest groups 
are seen in context."89 Thus, as Krasner writes, "In its most simplified and schematic 
form, interest group theories view politics as a vector diagram in which a series of pres-
sures are brought to bear on the state, which then moves in the direction it is pushed by 
the strongest societal forces."90 
Perhaps the most well-known application of interest-group theory to public policy 
is E. E. Schattschneider's Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. Schattschneider (1935) 
argues that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 was "a product of the desires of a multi-
plicity of economic actors."91 As a result, "Government policy was simply a summation 
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of private goods." Schattschneider's argument implies that "government policy is a 
reflection of whatever groups have power in society. The concept of the public interest 
slips away."93 Thus, interest-group theory posits that "the public or national interest can 
only mean some summation of private interests."94 
Towards a Theory of Rent-Seeking 
While Schattschneider illustrates that special-interest groups can infiltrate public 
policy for private gain, Olson (1971; 1982) illustrates how. He argues that organized 
interest groups rationally serve their "members' interests by obtaining a larger share of 
the society's production [i.e., budgets, likened to pies] for the organization's members" 
while giving nothing back to society. They are "utility maximizers" — i.e., the more 
profit they can make, the better. Far from being altruistic, they are capitalistic profiteers 
that interfere with a state's ability to institute policy and advance the national interest.96 
Olson argues that interest groups can obtain more of the budgetary pie either by 
increasing its overall size (while holding proportions constant), or "by obtaining larger 
shares or slices." 7 Groups rarely attempt to increase the social pie's overall size, as this 
requires them to expend significant resources in exchange for minimal gains. Instead, 
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they seek a larger slice of the pie.98 But, to pursue this larger slice, groups must divert 
resources from producing the social output "they produced in their previous employ-
ments," which "will reduce social output to some extent."99 Though they are part of this 
society and will endure the costs of their own greed, they have conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis and have determined that the benefits of their actions will outweigh the costs. 
They have made the "rational choice" to pursue their self interest at the expense of the 
national interest. Moreover, "the typical organization for collective action will do 
nothing"101 to recoup such expenses. As Olson states, "The familiar image of the slicing 
of the social pie does not really capture the essence of the situation; it is perhaps better to 
think of wrestlers struggling over the contents of a china shop."102 
As a result, interest groups are "overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the 
distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of additional output - they 
are 'distributional coalitions' (or organizations that engage in...'rent-seeking')."103 Dis-
tributional coalitions "are essentially free-riders: it is in their framework not to pay, yet 
they still reap social benefits."104 Thus, "they are a drag on budgets"105 and inhibit the 
state from pursuing the national interest, particularly in weak or semi-democratic states106 
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(e.g., the Russian Federation, 1992-present). "This will be expedient," Olson writes, 
"even if the social costs of the change in the distribution exceed the amount redistributed 
by a huge multiple; there is for practical purposes no constraint on the social cost such 
an organization will find it expedient to impose on the society in the course of obtaining a 
larger share of the social output for itself" 
Similarly, Gordon Tullock (1971) "focused on the resource cost of competitive 
lobbying of politicians and bureaucrats, both by those who seek to extract government 
transfers and by those who seek to prevent [them]."108 Tullock found that regardless of 
who wins the political or bureaucratic struggle, "the resources invested...are wasted and 
society as a whole is worse off."109 That rent-seeking happens in government is a certain-
ty. However, scholars are less certain about how to measure such rent-seeking — if it can 
be measured at all. Anne Krueger (1974) notes that "the value of rents associated with 
import licenses can be relatively large."110 And though "import licenses constitute a large 
and visible rent resulting from government intervention, the phenomenon of rent-seeking 
is far more general."111 Thus, as Robert Tollison (1998) states, "there exists no clear 
agreement in the literature about how to model rent-dissipation processes, and so there is 
no clear agreement about whether such costs bulk large or small in real economies." 
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The Way Forward 
Though "the social costs of rent seeking (Tullock 1967) forms the normative 
backdrop for the interest-group theory of government,"113 it is separate from the theory, 
itself. Indeed, as Tollison (1998) states, interest-group theory concerns lobbying, while 
rent-seeking theory concerns "the costs of lobbying."114 Bearing this distinction, this 
research recalls the original research question: why does Russia arm Iran? It also recalls 
Stephen J. Blank's analysis of the Russian defense-export industry under Putin, which 
illuminates a patrimonial, self-serving culture of military-industrial lobbying, rent-seek-
ing, and rent-granting. According to Blank, defense exports to Iran and other Russian 
client-states ostensibly represent the state pursuing its national interests. But since there 
are various rewards for the "stewards" of this process, there are also various incentives 
for them to lobby and seek rents at the expense of the national interest. Kremlin apparat-
chiks can now operate from within, turn the national interest on its head, and "wag the 
dog" in pursuit of their various special interests. Thus, this research will apply interest-
group theory to Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export policy to determine if it can 
link his general argument to Russia's military-technical relationship with Iran. 
Though interest-group theory has mostly been applied to domestic policy, it is 
applicable to foreign policy "when economic issues are at stake."115 Defense-export 
policy is one such issue. Here, there are clear links between policy and special interests — 
i.e., the defense industry. Indeed, as Krasner states, "Commercial agreements usually 
13
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have a very salient impact on particular actors and a diffuse impact on the society as a 
whole."116 Under such circumstances, interest-group theory suggests that Russia's 
defense-export policy vis-a-vis Iran has been strongly affected by interest groups and will 
most likely "reflect the demands of particular social groups." 
By default, this study will not analyze the costs of lobbying within Russia's mil-
itary-industrial complex (i.e., rent-seeking's impact on its defense industry, economy, 
military, and national security). Future studies could examine such costs and attempt to 
make connections. Furthermore, bureaucratic, corporate, elite, rent seeking and winning 
coalition theories may describe and explain Russia's defense-exports to Iran under Putin 
as well as interest-group theory. Therefore, this research does not attempt to discredit 
any one of them over the other. But because prior studies applied interest-group theory to 
Yeltsin-era defense exports to Iran, it seems natural to pick up where they left off. Also, 
Krasner proffers a group-centric theory when a state's foreign policy fails to meet his 
criteria for inducing the national interest. Thus, not only will this research test Blank's 
argument using interest-group theory, it will also determine if the theory is still applicable 






This study's purpose is to clarify Russia's post-Cold War defense-exports to Iran 
and other anti-Western states in order to determine Russia's place in the post-Cold War, 
and, more importantly, the post-9/11 environment. After the Berlin Wall fell, it was 
believed that the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, would cease the 
great power games of the Cold War and refrain from arming anti-Western regimes that 
threaten regional and international security. However, Russia has not only continued 
arming its Cold War-era client-states, like Syria, North Korea, and Iraq, it has also armed 
anti-Western or potentially anti-Western regimes in China, Iran, and Venezuela. For 
Western policy makers and military planners, alike, this is problematic — particularly as 
several of Russia's client-states possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and spon-
sor terrorism. Thus, one must ask: why does Russia arm hostile, anti-Western regimes? 
Is this an example of Russia pursing its national interests, or have special-interest groups 
again infiltrated the Kremlin? Finally, given its problematic proliferation in the post-9/11 
world, can Russia be considered a Western ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? 
Contribution 
This study contributes to the field of political science and international relations 
by adding to literature on post-Cold War Russian foreign and foreign military assistance 
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policy. Yet, unlike much of the literature, which provides various statist, top-down 
explanations,118 this study will provide a societal, bottom-up explanation. In addressing 
these questions, it will build upon previous studies that have used corporations, elites, 
and/or interest groups as their units of analysis, but have provided inconclusive or 
insufficient explanations.119 But, it will mostly test Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis of 
Russia's defense-export industry vis-a-vis its arms exports to Iran. Though groundbreak-
ing and insightful, it lacks a theoretical framework. Thus, his argument is questionable 
and deserves further scrutiny before it can be accepted as a viable domestic-level, group-
centric approach. 
Research Questions 
The Cold War ended nearly two decades ago. Russia and the West are no longer 
ideological rivals, but instead are economic partners with a common enemy in Islamic 
terrorism. However, just as the Berlin Wall fell, Russia and Iran began a contentious, 
multi-dimensional, and mutually beneficial relationship that has threatened Western 
allies, interests, and security. Thus, one has to ask (R.Q.): why does Russia arm Iran? Is 
it a top-down dynamic driven in pursuit of the state's national interest? Or, is it a bottom-
up dynamic driven in pursuit of special interest? Either way, what can U.S. and Western 
policy-makers do to counter the Kremlin's contentious arms trading behaviors? 
Hypotheses 
To answer these questions, the following hypotheses will be tested. However, 
two basic assumptions about the period from 2000 through present must be made: first, 
Such as Robert Freedman, Eugene Rumer, Brenda Shaffer, and others. 
Such as Tor Bukkvoll, Victor Mizin, Roma Tsvang and Ze'ev Wolfson. 
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that Iran's military and political leaders have always sought foreign military assistance -
either conventional arms, military-technical cooperation, or both; and second, that 
Russian bureaucratic and business institutions, if not the state or political leadership, have 
always been willing to provide Iran with such assistance. Thus, both the demand- and 
supply-sides of the Iranian-Russian equation must be held constant. 
This study's hypotheses (below) will test interest-group influence on, and activity 
within Russia's post-Cold War foreign military assistance policy towards Iran since 2000. 
Did the special interests find their way back into Russia's Iran policy in 2000? Have they 
pushed Russia's arms exports to Iran since, or do such exports reflect Russia pursuing its 
national interests? Finally, can rent-seeking behaviors account for Russian arms and 
assistance to Iran? The following hypotheses seek to answer these questions. 
HO: If interests groups do not lobby for arms sales, then sales will not increase. 
HI : If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then sales will increase. 
H2: If interest groups seek rents from arms sales, then sales will increase. 
Unit/Level of Analysis 
This study will work within the domestic level of analysis; its units will be 
special-interest groups. The domestic level is best for this research design because much 
of the literature concerning post-Cold War Russian foreign military assistance to Iran and 
other anti-Western states treats the issue at this level - particularly Stephen J. Blank's 
analysis. Thus, there is a substantial precedence for such a study. Also, since 
Russian FMA to Iran and its other client-states is an extension of Russia's overall foreign 
policy, it is necessary to look at the domestic determinants of this policy. Finally, the 
domestic level is best for this study because 
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the international variables that could have caused changes in Russia's arms 
policy have been relatively constant through the period under investigation: 
Iran has not changed in a way that would substantially affect Russian strat-
egic perceptions, U.S. political pressure not to sell arms has been unremit-
ting, and the Iranian desire to purchase Russian [weapons] of almost any 
kind is also unchanged. Thus there are good reasons to look for domestic 
reasons for the policy changes.120 
The only events that would have affected Russia's defense-exports to Iran vis-a-
vis the West and the U.S. are the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Given that 
Russia has faced a militant Islamic threat in Chechnya since the early 1990s, one would 
have expected Russian foreign policies to have become more cooperative with Western 
and U.S. security policies. That they have not is suggestive - though, not necessarily 
indicative — of a foreign policy-agenda that is decidedly different from, if not hostile to, 
Western and U.S. interests. Thus, knowing where Russia stands vis-a-vis arms control 
and proliferation issues will identify where it sits in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
world vis-a-vis the West. 
Methodology 
This study will conduct a crucial case-study121 of Russia's defense exports to Iran 
since Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 - specifically, Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis 
of Russia's defense-export industry. It will apply the interest group theory of government 
to his analysis to determine: (1) if there is any evidence to support his arguments, (2) if 
interest-group theory is a viable theoretical framework for his study, and (3) if interest-
group theory explains and describes Russia's defense-exports to Iran under Putin as well 
as it does under Yeltsin. 
121
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2005), 32-33. 
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A crucial case-study is best suited for this research design, as the specifics of the 
Russia-Iran defense-export dynamic make it difficult to be quantified and statistically 
studied. How does one quantify interest group power and influence? Or foreign policy 
decision-making vis-a-vis corporatist, elitist, or individual interest-group pressure? Thus, 
a qualitative analysis will account for Russia's nuanced economic, political, and social 
environments and achieve high internal validity vis-a-vis its foreign and foreign military 
assistance policies. However, to ensure high external validity, the proposed hypotheses 
are generally stated so that they may be applied to additional Russian client-states, as 
well as to Western client-states. 
However, because Russia's economic, political, and social environments are so 
complex, accurately and thoroughly conducting a qualitative analysis may be difficult. 
Access to accurate, relevant, and unbiased information may also be difficult. This 
research grants that because many Russian media outlets are state-owned, or are owned 
by Kremlin loyalists, finding reliable, unbiased information may be difficult. Kremlin-
controlled newspapers may be reluctant to report that special-interest groups continue to 
influence or set foreign policy. Conversely, Western academic and news outlets may too 
readily report that such interests have crept back into policy. Thus, control-ling for media 
bias will be one of this study's greatest challenges. 
Data 
Policy-related data will be collected from translated, online Russian daily news-
sources, such as Interfax, Itar-Tass, and Kommersant. They will be accessed primarily 
through World News Connection, the online, full-text database of foreign news reports 
collected by the U.S. Intelligence Community. Scholarly discussions on Russian 
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defense-export policies and practices will be culled from academic journals, such as The 
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Problems in Post-Communism, 
and Strategic Analysis. However, the marquise resource for this study will be Stephen J. 
Blank's Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry, a 
monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. 
Yearly statistical data on Russian arms sales to Iran will primarily be culled from 
defense and international security think-tanks, notably the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), but also the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Information on recent, 
ongoing, or future Russian FMA to Iran will primarily be culled from weekly defense 
publications, like Jane's Defence Weekly and other reliable mainstream media sources. 
Key Variables 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Military Assistance (see operationalization, below) 
Independent Variables: Interest Groups 
Control Variables: a) National Interest 
b) Non-state actors (e.g., illegal arms dealers) 
c) Rent-Seeking (as a dependent variable, it is outside the scope of study) 
d) Executive power/strength 
Operationalizations; Key Variables 
"Foreign Military Assistance," a broad term used by the U.S. Department of 
State,122 shall mean a) conventional arms123 transfers in exchange for currency, or in lieu 
U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 
2006," Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, http://www.state.goy/t/pm/rls/ipt/fintrpt/2006/74680.htm 
(Accessed June 12, 2008). 
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o f d e b t s o w e d t o t h e p a t r o n - b y t h e c l i en t - s t a t e ; a n d b ) " m i l i t a r y - t e c h n i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n " 
( M T C ) , w h i c h shal l i n c l u d e : 
• Organization of licensed armament and military equipment production abroad 
• Maintenance and repairs of armaments and military equipment supplied earlier 
• Modernization of armaments and military equipment made in Russia 
• Training of foreign specialists to operate and maintain supplied materiel, either in Russia 
or in customer countries 
• Technical assistance in building military infrastructure installations, such as defense 
enterprises, airfields, depots, firing grounds, training centers, etc. 124 
F o r th i s c a s e - s t u d y , " spec i a l - i n t e r e s t g r o u p s " shal l i n c l u d e : 1) R o s o b o r o n e k s p o r t 
( the l o n e , s t a t e - o w n e d a n d - con t ro l l ed d e f e n s e - e x p o r t c o m p a n y ) , 2 ) i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n s e 
c o m p a n i e s , 3 ) t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n s e ( M O ) a n d all s u b o r d i n a t e d c o m m i s s i o n s , c o m m i t -
t ee s , a n d s e r v i c e s , 4 ) t h e M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n Affai rs ( M I D ) , 5) t h e F e d e r a l Secu r i ty 
S e r v i c e ( F S B ) , a n d 6) t h e F o r e i g n In t e l l i gence S e r v i c e ( S V R ) . 1 2 5 
" S p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t g r o u p s " c a n b e p r i v a t e - o r p u b l i c - s e c t o r ins t i tu t ions . P r i v a t e 
in te res t g r o u p s , n o t a b l y d e f e n s e c o m p a n i e s , l o b b y e i ther t o s e c u r e a f avo rab l e p o l i c y 
f r o m t h e s ta te , o r a b u s i n e s s c o n t r a c t f rom t h e s ta te . G o v e r n m e n t ins t i tu t ions , l ike t h e 
M O o r M I D , c a n a l so b e c o n s i d e r e d in te res t g r o u p s w h e n t h e y p u r s u e t h e spec ia l in te res t , 
r a t h e r t h a n t h e n a t i o n a l in te res t . U n l i k e c o r p o r a t i o n s , w h i c h l o b b y for p o l i c i e s o r c o n -
t rac t s for m o n e t a r y ga in , s ta te ins t i tu t ions t yp i ca l l y l o b b y for p o l i c i e s tha t a l l o w t h e m to 
Note: This study excludes Russian atomic and nuclear energy assistance to Iran as a form of either FMA 
or MTC because it assumes that such assistance has been and continues to be legal according to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article IV, Section 2 of the NPT allows Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., Russia) to 
trade atomic and nuclear-related materials to, and to cooperate with Non-Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., Iran) 
for "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. Thus, this study 
assumes that Russian atomic and nuclear energy assistance to Iran is in accordance with the NPT. 
124
 "Company Info: Basic Trade Activities," Rosoboronexport: State Corporation, http:/'/www.roe.ru/ 
(accessed June 25, 2008). 
125
 It should be noted that groups three through six are all members of the siloviki, the so-called "power 
ministries" that are administered and staffed by current or former KGB agents. Those listed are all 
Kremlin-level ministries and services, and thus, are closely connected with President Vladimir Putin, 
himself a former KGB agent. 
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pursue ideological and/or political agendas. Moreover, as Blank argues, those directing 
the defense-export process have other incentives, as they are allowed to extract "rents" 
from the process [i.e., bribes, commissions (both legal and illegal), extortion, kickbacks, 
and malfeasance]. Far from furthering the national interest, state institutions can just as 
easily further their own interests. Thus, they are also considered special-interest groups. 
Operationalizations: Control Variables 
Regarding the "national interest," Krasner defines it as a state's "drives, compul-
sions, and aims...that are separate and distinct from the interests of a particular societal 
group," and "are associated either with general material objectives or with ambitious 
ideological goals related to beliefs about how societies should be ordered."126 
"Non-state actor interest" shall include arms dealers, civilian employees of the 
military and the military-industrial complex, and uniformed military personnel who have 
illegally acquired arms, munitions, and/or weapons platforms, and have sold them to 
other states, or entities within a state. This can also include engineers and technicians 
who have sold their services to a state for the development of the state's military-indus-
trial complex, modernization and/or repairs of weapons systems, training, et cetera. 
"Rent-seeking," defined by Blank, "means that people who are placed in a 
position where they have control over assets are able to appropriate the proceeds or rents 
from those assets to their private use without developing the property in question through 
a strategy of optimal investments."127 While this research argues that defense-industry 
officials and Kremlin apparatchiks are lobbying for arms sales to Iran in order to extract 
Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 10. 
Blank, Rosoboroneksport, 7. 
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rents from the process, as Tollison (1998) states, it is not concerned with the costs of such 
lobbying.128 It is outside the scope of this study and therefore must be controlled. 
Finally, "executive power/strength" will be measured by the state's decisions to 
provide arms and military-technical assistance to Iran vis-a-vis foreign (i.e., U.S.) pres-
sure not to provide them amidst escalating security concerns. Conversely, it will also be 
measured by the state's ability to restrain arms sales vis-a-vis arms control agreements, 
export controls, and foreign (i.e., Iranian) and domestic demand to provide arms. 
Measurement 
As best as possible, "foreign military assistance" will be measured in terms of: a) 
year ordered, b) dollar amount (in U.S. dollars) agreed to by both parties, and, where 
applicable, c) year and d) number delivered. The last two measurements are difficult, as 
it is often hard to measure results of extensive, ongoing military-technical cooperation, 
such as assisting in the development of a state's domestic arms industry, foreign military 
financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and others. 
Measuring interest-group pressure on Russia's defense-export policy vis-a-vis 
Iran will be done by analyzing English-translation editions of online Russian newspapers, 
as well as secondary sources written by Kremlin-watchers and post-Sovietologists. This 
research will look for evidence that Russia's defense and defense-export lobbies lobbied 
for, or defended arms exports when it was apparent that such exports would not, or did 
not advance Russia's national interests. Thus, cognizance of Russia's stated national 
interests, executive power to pursue, or uphold the national interest, and governmental 
processes will be vital in measuring this data. 
Tollison, "The Interest-group theory of Government," 2. 
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For example, interest groups are more influential vis-a-vis weak central govern-
ments, and little or no export controls or arms control agreements. Thus, active FMA 
lobbying under optimal conditions for interest groups, followed by a known FMA agree-
ment with a client-state would be a strong indicator that such lobbying was effective. 
However, active FMA lobbying under sub-prime conditions, followed by a known FMA 
agreement would be a weaker indicator that such lobbying was effective. Lastly, active 
FMA lobbying under sub-prime conditions, followed by no known FMA agreements 
would be the weakest indicator that such lobbying was influential. 
Limitations 
Because Russia's economic, political, and social environments are so nuanced, 
accurately and thoroughly conducting a qualitative analysis on this aspect of Russian 
foreign policy may be difficult. Likewise, access to accurate, unbiased, and useful infor-
mation may be difficult, given that neither the principal investigator's native language 
nor his academic background is in Russian. Language barriers may hinder this study, but 
the principal investigator is confident that such obstacles can be overcome via World 
News Connection and through English-language editions of Russian daily newspapers. 
Controlling for the "national interest" may make it difficult to determine if and 
when special interests drove Russian FMA to Iran or other client-states, and not vice-
versa. The nature of defense industries, particularly within capitalist economies, makes it 
difficult to differentiate between state and societal interests. Pursuance of state interests -
e.g., arms procurement for its military and allies — inevitably benefits special interests, 
like the defense industry. Thus, determining the dominant domestic determinant behind 
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Russian defense exports to Iran since President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 will be 
this study's primary challenge. 
Furthermore, this study acknowledges that applying the interest-group theory of 
government to Stephen J. Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export process may not 
describe and explain Russia's military-technical relationship with Iran as well as other 
theories. This study began with the assumption that, despite Putin's pledge to minimize 
the role of interest groups in the policy-making process, the defense and defense-export 
industries were still dominant and were pursuing their special interests in arming Iran. 
Since then, other theories have emerged in the literature, such as corporate, elite, and 
rent-seeking theories, which may be as insightful. Thus, interest-group theory may or 
may not be an adequate model for describing and explaining this process. Finally, as this 
study only works at the domestic level, it does not vet systemic (i.e., international) vari-
ables and theories that may round out Russia's military-technical relation-ship with Iran. 
For example, Russian arms may have been rewards for Iran's treatment of the Chechen 
Wars. Their relationship also makes sense vis-a-vis their mutual fear of U.S. regional 
and international hegemony. 
Conclusions 
Ironically, this study's limitations are what make its contributions to academia 
and policy so critical: cutting through the cultural and language barriers between Russia 
and the West, and analyzing post-Cold War Russian foreign policies to better understand 
its place in the world vis-a-vis the West. Differentiating between "national" and "special 
interests" and determining which has been, or is dominant in Russian policy circles will 
clarify Russia's place in the post-Cold War, and now the post-9/11 environment. Is 
42 
Russia an ally in the Global War on Terror whose foreign policies are regrettably 
influenced by domestic interest groups? Or, or is it actively and autonomously arming the 
West's next potential adversary? If so, then why? The answers to these questions grow in 
importance with each day, as both Russia and the U.S. may have to determine where 
Russia stands on the Iranian nuclear issue. 
Analyzing one of Russia's most dynamic, peculiar, and troubling bilateral 
relationships is the work of any good political or military intelligence analyst. Thus, 
identifying not only what foreign military assistance it has provided to Iran, but also why, 
is critical for preparing Western democracies to address such policies, and for preparing 




Post-Cold War Russian Foreign Military Assistance to Iran: 2000-2008 
This chapter will begin with a brief overview of Russo-Iranian military-technical 
cooperation from November 1989 through December 1999. Understanding the depth and 
scope of their pre-2000 bilateral relationship is critical for understanding their post-2000 
relationship. Many arms and military-technical agreements signed during Putin's tenure 
have concerned repair or upgrade of arms and weapons platforms delivered during the 
Gorbachev or Yeltsin years (see Appendix A for a tabled list of all major Russo-Iranian 
defense contracts signed since 1989). Also, some arms, like helicopters and anti-tank 
guided missiles (ATGMs) were ordered in the 1990s but were delivered after 2000. 
This chapter will then describe and analyze Russia's defense exports to Iran since 
early 2000. It will chronologically list and detail the arms sales and military-technical 
contracts signed between the two countries. It will survey statements made by Kremlin 
and industry leaders to analyze the domestic actors who were prominent in the process, as 
well as their justifications for conducting such deals. In doing so, it will illuminate the 
alternating influence of special-interest groups in the Russo-Iranian military-technical 
relationship vis-a-vis the state's attempt to conduct a rational foreign policy. It will also 
apply interest-group theory to Stephen J. Blank's argument that under Putin's patrimon-
ial, power-vertical defense-export system, parasitic rent-seekers undermine the state's 
efforts to pursue the national interest via defense exports. It will attempt to show active 
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rent-seeking and granting in the Russo-Iranian defense-export paradigm. 
Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the case-study. It will 
review the major arms contracts signed between Moscow and Tehran, the justifications 
provided, and the domestic actors and forces prevalent in the process. It will also show 
Kremlin decision-making vis-a-vis domestic pressure-groups, Iranian pressure to provide 
arms, and Washingtonian pressure to halt arms amidst an escalating nuclear crisis. 
Background 
Late-1989 to Mid-1995: Open Sales 
On November 5, 1989, Iran's Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Rafsanjani, flew to 
Moscow to discuss arms deals with Soviet officials.129 There, "the first Russo-Iranian 
intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed,"130 and 
resulted in a total of $5.1 billion in arms sales.131 The first deal included 24 MiG-29A 
Fulcrum multi-role fighters, 12 Su-24MK Fencer fighter-bombers,132 R-60 and R-27 
(NATO reporting names: AA-8 Aphid and AA-10 Alamo) air-to-air missiles, a 10-year 
spare-parts agreement, and 2 batteries of the S-200BE (NATO reporting name: SA-5B 
Gammon) surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.133 It also "cement[ed] bilateral ties and 
mutual confidence" between Moscow and Tehran.134 
Mali , "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran," 99. 
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 Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs," 33. 
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 Mikhail Barabanov, "Russia on Iran's Market for Arms," Moscow Defense Brief'(Moscow), 2007 
http://nidb.cast.ru/mdb/l-2006/arins trade/item 1/ (Accessed June 22, 2008). 
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 Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs," 33. 
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 Barabanov, "Russia on Iran's Market for Arms," 2007. 
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 Jalali, "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran," 99. 
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On May 17, 1990, Russia agreed to sell 3 877EKM Kilo-class diesel-electric 
submarines to Iran. A year and a half later, it provided Iran with the domestic production 
capacity for more than 1,000 T-72S main battle tanks (MBTs) and 1,500 BMP-2 infantry 
fighting vehicles (IFVs).135 The deal further developed Iran's military-industrial 
complex, which would allow it to produce more of its own arms.136 Also in 1991, Russia 
contracted to deliver approximately 15,000 AT-4 Spigot ATGMs,137 which began in 1993 
and continue through today. 
Mid-1995 to late-2000: Yeltsin's "No New Contracts" Policy 
By 1994, Russia had delivered to Iran all of the MiG-29 and Su-24s fighters, air-
to-air and surface-to-air missiles, 2 Kilo subs, 80 BMP-2s, 100 T-72s, and about 800 AT-
4 ATGMs - a sizable arsenal, indeed. But in September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
stated that arms sales to Iran would end after all current contracts were fulfilled.138 He 
cited the Kremlin's "wish to participate in the development of a 'post-COCOM [Coor-
dinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control]' system".139 Such an initiative 
would also improve relations with the U.S., which would hopefully offset revenue losses. 
Then on June 30, 1995, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice-
President Al Gore signed the secretive and controversial document, dubbed the "Gore-
Chernomyrdin Agreement," by which Russia agreed to forgo signing additional arms 
Barabanov, "Russia on Iran's Market for Arms," 2007. 
136
 Ibid. Russia built the T-72 MBT factory, which began production on July 8, 1997 in Dorud, and the 
BMP-2 IFV factory, which started work in 1998, in Tehran. 
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export contracts with Iran and complete deliveries of arms currently under contract by the 
end of 1999. In exchange, the U.S. would help Russian firms find new arms markets, and 
use Russian space-launch vehicles (SLVs) to launch commercial satellites into orbit.' 
Yeltsin's "no new contracts" initiative in late 1994, followed by the secret Gore-
Cheromyrdin Agreement in mid-1995 subsequently stemmed the flow of Russian arms 
and MTC to Iran. However, per the Agreement, Russia delivered its third and final Kilo-
class diesel-electric submarine to Iran in 1996,141 complete with "large numbers of wake-
homing torpedoes... and advanced naval mines".142 Thus, between 1996 and 1999, the 
financial value of Russian arms sales to Iran totaled just $200 million.143 However, this 
figure hides the illicit technical and technological assistance provided to Iran's missile 
programs. From 1994144 through at least 1998,145 Russian missile technicians and parts 
found their way into Iran, which hastened Iran's Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) program. Also, Iranian engineers, physicists, and missile technicians received 
assistance from Russian universities (see Appendix B for a list of those sanctioned by the 
U.S. Government).146 While the Kremlin admitted that some "individual contacts' 
141
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between Iranian and Russian entities" had occurred, they were not state-sponsored. 
However, "reports surfaced in early 1998 that the Russian FSB [Federal Security 
Service, Russia's chief domestic intelligence and security agency] was coordinating clan-
destine missile technology transfers to Iran — allegations denied by Russian officials". 
A CIA report was among those that exposed Russia's illicit ballistic missile assistance to 
Iran.149 Despite these allegations, Russian officials claim that it had not violated any of its 
export-control and/or non-proliferation agreements - notably, the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR).150 Though, given that in late-1998, Iran's Islamic Revolution-
ary Guards Corp (IRGC) successfully test-launched the Shahab-3A MRBM, it is difficult 
to imagine that Russian technical assistance had not found its way into Iran's suddenly 
successful ballistic missile program. 
Late-2000 to Present: Renewed Arms Contracts 
In the mid-to-late-1990s, Iran's defense industry began to produce Russian arms 
under license. Thus, by January 2000, Iran had procured a total of 422 T-72 MBTs and 
413 BMP-2 IFVs,151 and soon acquired a license to produce Russian tank rounds. That 
month, it also began to mass-produce the AT-5 Spandrel ATOM,'52 in addition to hun-
dreds of AT-6s, thousands of AT-4s, and thousands more ATGMs on order. It had also 
Rubin, "What are Iran's Domestic Priorities?" 30. For a list of Russian firms suspected of having been 
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received more than two dozen Russian Mi-17H and Mi-171Sh multi-role helicopters. 
Many of these acquisitions were allowed under the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement. 
But SIPRI data suggests that the Mi-171sh helicopters and the AT-5 and -6 ATGMs with 
which they could be armed violated the Agreement, as they were ordered after June 30, 
1995.153 Additionally, the successful test-launch of Iran's Shahab-3A MRBM in late-
1998 strongly suggests that Russian technical and technological assistance found its way 
to Iran since before 1995, further undermining Russia's non-proliferation commitments. 
Over the next eight years, Russia would not only continue to provide arms and 
military-technical assistance to Iran (indeed, defense-exports peaked in 2000 when they 
should have receded), it would also renege on the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement 









Figure 3: Russian Arms Exports to Iran: 2000-2007 
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Figure 3: Source, "Trend Indicator Value of arms exports from Russia, 1992-2007," Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 31, 2008. 
SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Generated June 11, 2007. 
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relationship, again citing SIPRI TIV data. Though, it is ironic that defense-export 
volumes decreased from 2001 on - after Russia indicated it would sign new defense con-
tracts with Iran. But as Figure 2 indicates, the volume spiked in 2006 to $366 million. 
Active Lobbying 
In March 2000, Vladimir Putin officially became President of Russia. Putin's 
presidency marks the most significant evolutionary period in Russia's defense and 
defense-export policies — particularly regarding Iran.154 Signs of this evolution appeared a 
month earlier, when Putin stated that Russia should "engage the enormous scientific-tech-
nical and human resources of the [MIC] as much as possible".155 In April, Boris Kuzyk, 
Yeltsin's military-technical cooperation advisor, echoed Putin's statements. He added 
that "Russia should explore the arms markets 'more deeply, actively, rationally and con-
sistently,'"156 with the government lobbying "Russia's interests in the key countries and 
regions."157 Coincidentally, Kuzyk was also "the general director of the New Programs 
and Concepts military-industrial holding company, one of the largest Russian companies 
of its kind."158 Though he was speaking on behalf of the Russian MIC's interests, he 
might has well have been speaking of his own. 
In August 2000, Putin merged Rossiyskiye Tekhnologii into Promexport - both 
state-controlled defense-export companies. Then on November 4, Putin merged Prom-
Basu, "Russian Military-Technical Cooperation," 10. 
155
 Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs," 39. 
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export and Rosvoorehzenie and created Rosoboronexport, Russia's sole, state-controlled 
arms-export company, to increase commercial efficiency and governmental oversight. 
Towards these ends, he appointed former Deputy Director of Promexport, Andrei 
Belyaninov as Director of Rosoboroneksport. Putin then named former Director General 
of Promexport, Sergei Chemezov, as First Deputy Director of Rosoboroneksport. 
Coincidentally, both Belyaninov and Chemezov served with Putin in the KGB. 159 
A day before Putin consolidated the defense-export sector and created Rosoboron-
eksport, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov informed U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright that Russia was withdrawing from the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Agreement. He gave two reasons: (1) the secret Agreement was disclosed during the 
2000 U.S. Presidential Election; and (2) Iran had made positive domestic political and 
social changes, and Russia would reward it, ironically, with renewed arms sales.160 
Three weeks later, Kremlin officials defended withdrawing from the Agreement 
and offered a plethora of economic, international, legal, and strategic reasons. Ilya Kleb-
anov, First Deputy Prime Minister, said Russia would soon negotiate the sale of defen-
sive weapons to Iran, which would "not violate Russia's international commitments."161 
He added, "There are quite a lot of limitations on the supply of weapons to such a country 
as Iran, relating to both distance and speed."162 Similarly, Andrei Nikolayev, Chairman 
of the State Duma Committee for Defence, insisted that "Russia has always proceeded 
159
 Basu, "Russian Military-Technical Cooperation," 10. 
150
 Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs," 38. 
161
 "Russia to Start Talks with Iran on Defensive Hardware Sales Soon," Interfax (Severodvinsk), 
November 24, 2000, http://wnc.dialog.com/ (accessed June 7, 2008). 
162
 "Russia Ready to Negotiate Supply of Conventional Weapons with Iran - Klebanov," Interfax 
(Moscow), November 27, 2000, http://wnc.dialog.com/ (accessed June 7, 2008). 
51 
from the observance of international obligations, including the non-proliferation of nuc-
lear and missile technologies."163 But the Agreement "has no legal force," and "was not 
an agreement and not an official document."164 Thus, Moscow was not bound to it and 
could pursue relations with Iran, its "strategic partner in the southerly direction."165 
While Nikolayev believed that renewed Russo-Iranian MTC "will bring political 
advantages, above all,"166 he also noted that "Iran is a solvent country, which will be 
paying in cash."167 Similarly, General Anatoly Kvashnin, head of the Russian General 
Staff, stated that Russia would expand its MTC "with any countries if it benefits Russia, 
benefits its defensive capability, among other things."168 
Though Kremlin officials gave international, legal, and strategic reasons for 
renewing Russo-Iranian MTC, their last two statements point the research towards 
economic motives. By 2000, Moscow still had between $1.5 and $2.2 billion in arms and 
services to deliver to Tehran. Ceasing arms shipments then would have deprived the 
MIC of these modest, yet badly needed revenues.169 Since it continued to sell Iran arms 
after the December 31, 1999 deadline, it seems that the Russian defense industry was 
already trying to preserve as much revenue as possible from its prior Iranian deals. 
Moreover, Tsvang and Wolfson (2001) note that sometime in 2000, Iranian leaders 
163
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decided to undertake a 25-year military-modernization program that would emphasize 
Russian arms and technology.170 Thus, "it was now worthwhile for Moscow to abandon 
the limitations placed upon it by the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreements." 
Quite obviously, renewed arms contracts with Iran were in the defense industry's 
interests. But given Putin's recent consolidation of the defense-export industry to control 
policy and revenue,172 how could the MIC have secured this lucrative policy? It had two 
possible - though, not mutually exclusive - inroads through which to lobby Putin. First, 
the defense industry campaigned on his behalf before the 2000 presidential election, and 
the export sector, in particular (pre-Rosoboroneksport) allegedly "made substantial con-
tributions to Putin's election campaign."173 Thus, Putin could have repaid his "winning 
coalition" member by forgoing with an unpopular policy and pledging to renew arms 
contracts with Iran. 
Second, given that the defense industry had representatives close to Putin, it is 
very possible that they lobbied for new arms contracts with Iran through this '"class-
friendly faction of KGB veterans in Putin's entourage.'"175 Indeed, both Andrei Belyan-
inov and Sergei Chemezov had served with Putin in the KGB and were, at the time, both 
serving at Rosoboroneksport. Observers at Nezavisimaia Gazeta later cited Boris Kuzyk 
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"as the prime mover of the new policy."176 One should recall that in April, he had stated 
that "Russia should explore the arms markets 'more deeply, actively, rationally and con-
sistently,'"177 with the government lobbying "Russia's interests in the key countries and 
regions."178 Moreover, Boris Kuzyk was the only MIC representative named in Novaia 
Gazeta's October 2000 list of trusted governmental and presidential spokesmen.17 Thus, 
it is possible that Kuzyk, a trusted and vested MIC lobbyist, could have lobbied Putin to 
annul the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and renew arms contracts with Iran. 
Whether the defense industry called in Putin's debts, or lobbied their interests 
through their "class-friendly faction of KGB veterans" in the Kremlin — or both - it is 
clear that domestic economic actors lobbied for, and would later receive a favorable Iran 
policy. Indeed, Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace stated that at the time, "Putin was 'constantly looking over his shoul-
der at lobby groups."180 These suspicions were confirmed in early December 2000 when 
Andrei Nikolayev told reporters that "the economic benefits and business opportunities 
for Russia's defence industry"181 were the most important reasons for resuming arms 
negotiations with Iran.182 Thus, Moscow planned to sign roughly $7 billion in contracts 
176
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with Tehran "over the next few years." In light of such lucrative prospects, Jane's Intel-
ligence Digest wrote, "the Russians are prepared to risk an inevitable rise in tension with 
Washington by ditching a memorandum which never had the status of a ratified, legally-
binding treaty."183 Thus, in addition to international, legal, and strategic variables, the 
political economy of the Russian defense industry clearly weighed in Putin's decision to 
abrogate the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and renew arms contracts with Iran. 
In early December, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev flew to Tehran to 
discuss future military-technical cooperation with Iran.184 He had hoped that broadening 
Russo-Iranian relations would strengthen "security and stability in Central Asia"185 -
serving both countries' national interests.186 It would begin with "supplying spare parts 
to the Soviet and Russian military equipment that the Iranian armed forces already poss-
ess," followed by conventional arms for defensive purposes.187 It would also "include 
bilateral 'consultations on security...the mutual notification about military doctrines and 
military building in our countries,'"188 and international military education and training 
(IMET).189 The MoD reiterated its claims that Moscow's rapprochement with Tehran 
was in both countries' national interests.190 
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In early February 2001, the ultra-nationalist Vice-Chairman of Russia's State 
Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, led a parliamentary delegation to Tehran to promote the 
new policy out of pure ideological interest.191 Zhirinovsky and other "supporters of an 
assertive foreign policy,"192 like former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov, "count on 
closer ties with Iran, India, and China to challenge US influence and promote a multi-
polar world." Primakov, himself, would later travel with his own delegation to deliver an 
identical message.193 Later that month, Iran's ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, indi-
cated that Iranian President Mohammed Khatami would sign defense contracts with 
Russian firms worth between $6.5 and $7 billion. On March 11, Khatami flew to Mos-
cow seeking advanced arms and increased domestic production capacity,194 including: 
Ka-50 Hokum attack helicopters195 
Mi-8/17H Hip multi-role helicopters 
Additional MiG-29 Fulcrum multi-role fighter jets 
Su-25 Frogfoot CAS fighter-aircraft 
Su-27 Flanker air-superiority fighter jets 
Additional T-72 MBTs, and the more advanced T-90 MBTs 
Advanced naval mines and torpedoes 
Licenses to produce Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines196 
Overhaul/upgrade of Iran's three existing Kilos 
Production technology for artillery, aviation, and warships 
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• Self-propelled air defense systems: BUK-M1, S-300P, 7 S-300V, and Tor-Mi 
• Igla-IE (NATO reporting name: SA-16 Gimlet) MANPADS198 
• Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) capability 
• Launchers for its Shahab-3 MRBMs199 
On March 12, President Putin described the arms and services sought by Iran as 
purely defensive, adding that "Iran has the right to ensure its country's defensive capacity 
and security."200 However, most of the arms listed above are quite robust, and could very 
easily be used in an offensive manner. 
Regardless, on March 15, Khatami and Putin issued a joint communique confir-
ming that "mutually advantageous cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and 
technical [arenas meet] the national interests of the two countries and plays an important 
role in the cause of supporting peace and stability at the regional and global levels.201 
The communique also stated that Moscow and Tehran's military-technical cooperation 
was "not directed against third countries."202 Khatami then reportedly signed a total of 
$6.7 billion in contracts, with an average of $300 million in arms, hardware, and military-
technical assistance to be provided annually.203 Thus, the Russian MIC got what it wan-
ted. As Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, the "military-industrial lobbies 
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are obviously more powerful in the Kremlin today than they were in the 1990s." 
On October 5, 2001, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani met with his Rus-
sian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, in Moscow. Shamkhani sought anti-aircraft, anti-ship, 
and anti-tank missiles, as well as Tochka-U (NATO reporting name: SS-21 Scarab) and 
Iskander-E (NATO reporting name: SS-26 Stone) tactical/theater ballistic missiles TBM) 
— again, hardly defensive weapons.205 Nevertheless, the two defense ministers signed a 
10-year intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation.20 
Disappointment-Corruption 
Two months later, the first Iranian defense order placed since the 1995 Gore-
Chernomyrdin Agreement was reached: a paltry $150 million contract for 30 Mi-171sh 
multi-role helicopters. Moreover, Iran apparently acquired just 20 or 21 of the aircraft 
from Russia in 2002.208 In all, the deal fell far short of both Russian military-industrial 
and Iranian military-political expectations, suggesting that either Moscow had shown 
restraint vis-a-vis U.S. concern or that Iran could not afford more. 
Still, there is a third possibility: corruption, mismanagement, and patrimony at 
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Rosoboroneksport - the sole, state-controlled arms-exporter that conducted the deal. In 
June 2001, reports emerged that President Putin was unhappy with Director Belyaninov 
and Deputy Director Chemezov, and that their KGB legacies were hindering company 
performance.209 As Viktor Litovkin states, "representatives of special organizations 
[security services] do not always use economic arguments in their work and they some-
times confuse the interests of the state and its enterprises with the interests of particular 
groups of state officials."210 While there is nothing wrong with former spies working in 
the arms-export industry, they should not lead that industry, as that inevitably leads to 
patrimonialism. Under patrimonial business relationships, success often hinges on who 
you know rather than what you know - a costly and inefficient business practice.211 
While Litovkin did not connect these legacies and practices to Rosoboronek-
sport's dealings with Iran, a report published in mid-December of that year suggests that 
there had been some mismanagement of company funds, with potential linkage to Iranian 
contracts. The State Audit Chamber had exposed "violations in the arms trade, including 
small deductions to the federal budget,"212 which Putin's Committee for Military-Tech-
nical Cooperation (CMTC) could not explain. These "small" deductions amounted to 
$70 million, suggesting corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement at Rosoboronek-
sport,213 right around the time of the Mi-171 deal. 
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Russo-Iranian Military-Technical Developments 
In addition to the apparently botched helicopter deal, several reputable sources 
claim that sometime in 2001, Iran procured two batteries of the S-300 PMU (NATO 
reporting name: SA-10C Grumble C) self-propelled air defense system from Russia, 
complete with 96 4V55RUD long-range, low-to-high altitude SAMs.214 The systems 
reportedly became operational in February 2003 and are positioned in and around 
Tehran,215 but neither their status nor origin can be confirmed. Also, sources have "con-
firmed" to Jane's Defence Weekly that, as of May 2007, Iran had acquired at least two of 
the newer, more advanced versions of the system, either the S-300 PMU-1 or PMU-2.216 
However, like the older variants, neither their status nor their origins can be confirmed. 
Meanwhile, Russian officials have consistently denied exporting them to Iran. 
The years 2002 through 2004 were fairly unremarkable for the Russo-Iranian 
arms trade. In 2002, Russia shipped 20 or 21 of the 30 Mi-171sh military transport heli-
copters that Tehran originally ordered. In 2003, Russia delivered the first three of six Su-
25T Frogfoot close air-support (CAS) fighter-aircraft to Iran, which complemented the 
seven ex-Iraqi Air Force Su-25s that were flown to Iran during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. In September 2003, the U.S. government sanctioned Russia's Tula Instrument 
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Design Bureau "for selling laser-guided artillery shells to Iran."217 The move was more 
likely a diplomatic warning shot than a punitive measure, as the U.S. government and 
military did not contract with Tula. But in 2004 and again in 2005, Russo-Iranian MTC 
hit its lowest levels, plunging below 1995 levels to just $14 million in annual volume. 
In July 2005, Rosoboroneksport contracted with Iranian officials to repair and 
upgrade its 3 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. Each would be serviced for $80 or 
$90 million, to include the fitting of Russia's newest anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the 
3M-54 Klub-S (NATO reporting name: SS-N-27 Sizzler).218 By year's end, at least one 
Kilo had been serviced, but it was unknown if the ASCMs were, or would be installed.219 
Taking Sides? 
In August 2005, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) presented 
Iran's newly-elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with an incentives-based prop-
osal to halt its nuclear program. After the EU-3's proposal was "contemptuously rejected 
as a joke, and Iran announced the resumption of work at the uranium enrichment conver-
sion plant at Isfahan,"220 the issue was referred to the IAEA. Thus, in late September, the 
IAEA met to discuss Iran's nuclear program and how to address it. Russia opposed refer-
ring the matter to the UN Security Council.221 "But, after a heated debate, Russia (along 
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with eleven other countries) abstained from an IAEA resolution, passed 22 to 15"222 that 
ultimately referred Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council.223 Robert Freedman 
(2006) notes that 
Russia's behavior at the IAEA meeting illustrated Moscow's ongoing dil-
emma in dealing with Iran. While [it] did not want Iran to acquire nuclear 
weapons, it also did not want sanctions imposed on one of its closest allies, 
who was also a good customer, buying not only the Bushehr nuclear reac-
tor (and possibly more in the future) but military equipment, as well.224 
Despite Russia's abstention, a second IAEA meeting was scheduled for late 
November. Meanwhile, Tehran escalated the crisis by reprocessing more uranium at 
Isfahan. Then, the Iranian parliament voted "to stop IAEA inspection of its facilities if 
the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council."225 At the IAEA meeting, "Moscow 
continued to oppose referring Iran to the UN Security Council,"226 though it 
acknowledged "that it could happen."227 Russian delegates also compromised with the 
EU-3 to allow Iran to convert enriched uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas: the 
enrichment would happen in Russia, but the conversion would happen in Iran.228 This 
would ensure that Iran would not enrich uranium to weapons grade, but preserve its right 










and demanded "the right to develop a full fuel cycle." 
Soon after the IAEA meeting, reports emerged that Russian and Iranian officials 
had signed a $1.4 billion arms contract - their largest since the early-1990s. Rosoboron-
eksport would modernize Iran's Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-24 fighters, and sell it 29 Tor-
Mi (NATO reporting name: SA-15 Gauntlet) mobile, short-range air defense (SHORAD) 
systems, with which Iran would defend its nuclear infrastructure. Indeed, the head 
of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS; formerly the 
CMTC), Mikhail Dmytriyev, stated that their "mission is to protect a specific facility"232 
(i.e., the Busheher reactor complex). Likewise, Defense Minister and First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stated that the systems were "designed for the defence of that 
country."233 Furthermore, Putin stated "We have done this so that Iran should not feel 
cornered or [sic] that is in some hostile surrounding and understand that he has a channel 
for communication and friends who can be trusted."234 
The timing of the deal, coupled with the above statements, suggest a calculated, 
state-autonomous attempt by the Kremlin to balance Russia's domestic-economic and 
regional security interests vis-a-vis foreign pressure - both to sell and not to sell arms to 
Iran. Russia's defense industry had wanted to renew, and then expand its sales to Iran, 
while Tehran had wanted fighter-upgrades and air-defense systems (among many other 
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items) from Moscow since at least Khatami's March 2001 visit. Thus, it appears that for 
nearly five years, Moscow had restrained both domestic and foreign pressure to provide 
such arms until it was deemed appropriate — useful, even — for it to do so. After the 
November IAEA meeting, it was clear that Iran's nuclear program would progress, and 
the matter would be referred to the UN Security Council. There, Russia would have to 
either agree to sanction Iran, or obstruct the diplomatic process, which experience has 
shown to lead to preventative military action. Either way, Russia's economic and region-
al interests were at stake. By providing Iran with short-range, low-to-medium altitude air 
defense systems, Moscow satisfied its defense-industrial lobby, helped Tehran deter 
military action, and preserved the regional military balance in the process. 
Thus, in 2006, Russia began upgrading Iran's MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and 
would deliver the first Tor-Mi SHORAD systems in December.235 Meanwhile, Russia 
delivered three Su-25UBK combat-trainer aircraft and 40 R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) short-range 
air-to-air missiles to Iran's Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC). It also sold the 
VA-111 Shkval rocket-propelled, super-cavitating torpedo to the Iranian Navy, and tested 
it during summer naval exercises in the Persian Gulf. In response, the U.S. Department 
of State sanctioned Rosoboroneksport and Sukhoi on July 28, 2006, citing their violations 
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.236 It sanctioned Rosoboroneksport again on 
December 28, as well as the Kolomna and Tula Design Bureaus, this time citing the Iran 
and Syria Nonproliferation Act.237 
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The Russian Foreign Ministry rejected the sanctions as "an application of domes-
tic legislature to international matters."238 Despite the sanctions, both the value and vol-
ume of Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation spiked in 2006, as by then, Iran had 
also procured hundreds more BMP-2 IFVs and T-72 MBTs, and thousands more ATGMs 
from Russia. Indeed, Mikhail Dmitriyev, director of Russia's FSVTS, confirmed that the 
sanctions had no effect Russia's MTC with foreign states. "However," he added, "that 
was a very important message for us." 39 
A Conflict of Interests? 
In January 2007, Pavel Felgenhauer of the conservative Jamestown Foundation 
noted that Viktor Ivanov, an advisor and colleague of Putin from their KGB years, is the 
chairman of the board of directors of Almaz-Antei.240 In fact, Putin, who had been 
recruited to the KGB by Ivanov in the 1970s, appointed Ivanov and other former KGB 
officers to Almaz-Antei in 2002 "to control the billions of dollars of proceeds generated 
by anti-aircraft missile exports." 41 Coincidentally, the state-owned air-defense consor-
tium manufactured the Tor-Mis that were sold to Iran. Thus, as Felgenhauer notes, "this 
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made the Iranian Tor-Mi contract a very special order for Kremlin insiders." 
Indeed, the contract typifies the patrimonialism and conflicted interests that are 
inherent in Russia's military-industrial and military-technical affairs. Andrei Belyaninov, 
Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Viktor Ivanov, and Mikhail Dmitriyev all served with 
Putin in the KGB or FSB, either in East Germany or St. Petersburg. Coincidentally - or 
perhaps consequently — they have all had personal and professional interests in Russia's 
defense and defense-export industry (see Table 1, below). Sergei Chemezov holds stock 
in both Rosoboroneksport and Rostekhnologii (Rosoboroneksport's state-owned holding-
company), and is CEO of the latter. Moreover, Sergei Ivanov, who now directs the 
Military-Industrial Commission and its subordinate, the Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), became chairman of the board of directors at the United 
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) in December 2006.243 Since OAK owns MiG, Sukhoi, and 
other military aircraft companies, Ivanov would personally benefit from aircraft sales, 
repairs, and modernization contracts with Iran. These conflicted interests further blur the 
line between pursuing their business interests and Russia's national interests. 









OAK (United Aircraft Corporation: Ilyushin, MiG, Sukhoi, and 
Tupolev), Rosnanotech, Rosoboroneksport 
Aeroflot (Civilian Aircraft Company), Almaz-Antei 
Table 1: Brian D. Taylor, Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce (Syracuse: Maxwell, 2007), 
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Brian D. Taylor, Russia's Power Miinistries: Coercion and Commerce (Syracuse: Maxwell, 2007), 48. 
66 
Prospective Deals 
Throughout 2007, British, Israeli, and Iranian media reported that Russian-Iranian 
military-technical cooperation would increase — qualitatively and quantitatively - with 
the sale of newer and more advanced conventional arms. Moreover, the reports came 
after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1747, which barred states from directly 
or indirectly providing arms, military-technical, and/or nuclear assistance to Iran. Thus, 
news that Moscow was ratcheting up its defense-exports to Iran on the heals of prior 
exports suggested that Russia, which had voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1747, was 
again merely paying lip-service to international security while undermining it. 
On May 22, 2007, Jane's Defence News reported that Iran would receive at least 
10 Pantsyr-SIE (NATO reporting name: SA-22 Greyhound) advanced SHORAD systems 
from Russia via Syria, which had just contracted with Rosoboroneksport for 50 such 
systems. Citing a source close to the deal, Robin Hughes wrote, "Iran will [sic] part 
finance the Syrian acquisition along with payment for its own 10 systems to Damascus 
for its compliance with the deal."245 Furthermore, the systems Iran would receive would 
"not be taken from the first ones supplied to Syria but from later deliveries,"246 and would 
thus arrive in late-2008.247 The indirect route of the systems would allow Russian 
officials to categorically deny that they had sold them to Iran. However, since UNSC 
Resolution 1747 forbids arms cascading, Russia would still be in violation. 
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On July 30, 2007, The Jerusalem Post published a sensationalist report indicating 
that Iran may purchase 250 Su-30MKI Flanker multi-role fighter aircraft and 20 IL-76 
airborne tankers with which to extend their range.248 If true, the deal would make the 
Iranian Air Force the preeminent air force in the Middle East and alter the military 
balance decidedly in Iran's favor. However, Russian officials have flatly denied the deal 
and as of June 30, 2008, nothing has come of it. 
As fears of a preventative U.S. or Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure 
mounted, voices within Russia's State Duma lobbied for more, and more advanced arms 
sales to Iran. On September 5, the ultra-nationalist Vice-Chairman of the State Duma, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for the rapid delivery of Russia's newest, most advanced air 
defense system, the S-400 Triumf (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) to Iran. 
Given the imminence of an air strike on Iran's infrastructure, Zhirinovksy called for the 
air-defense systems to "be delivered as soon as possible to enable Iran to defend its 
airspace."249 The Triumf had just been successfully tested that summer, but despite Mr. 
Zhirinovsky's urging, defense-industry sources had already stated that the S-400 would 
not be exported to any country - even those in the CIS - in the next few years.250 
Regardless, tensions eased on December 2 when the U.S. National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) published its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Iran: Nuclear Inten-
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tions and Capabilities." According to the NIE, the U.S. intelligence community assessed 
"with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."251 
However, it also assessed "with moderate-to-high confidence"252 that, at a minimum, 
Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons."253 
Encouraged by the NIE, Russian and Iranian officials met later that month at their 
fourth intergovernmental commission for military-technical cooperation in Tehran.254 
There, they negotiated the sale of additional air defense systems, Ka-32 helicopters, and 
modified RD-33 aircraft engines to upgrade Iran's aging fleet of F-5 fighters, as well as 
all domestically produced variants of the U.S.-made aircraft. Speaking of the arms deal, 
Mikhail Dmitriev, head of Russia's FSVTS, stated that "Russia and Iran are 
strengthening stability in the region." 255 He also stressed that the arms in question were 
defensive, and that "Iran has never asked for and Russia would never give Iran offensive 
weapons to encourage, conditionally speaking, aggression against anyone."256 
But on December 27, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammed-Najjar stated 
that Russia would sell Iran five batteries of the S-300PMU-1 mobile air-defense system 
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for $800 million.257 If true, Tehran would significantly enhance its air-defense capability, 
which would shield its nuclear infrastructure from air and missile strikes, and thus allow 
it to progress with an offensive nuclear weapons program. The next day, Russia's 
FSVTS denied negotiating the deal,258 while Rosoboroneksport and Almaz-Antei had no 
comment. But neither denied the deal,259 suggesting that Tehran and Moscow are playing 
a game of calculated ambiguity in order to test the waters in Washington and Jerus-
alem.260 "If followed through," Pavel Baev writes, "these developments could signify not 
only a 'softening' of Russia's position on the long-unfolding Iran crisis, but a complete 
collapse of the international efforts aimed at dismantling Iran's nuclear program."261 
Summary 
This chapter examined Russia's post-Cold War military-technical relationship 
with Iran from 2000 to present day - basically, since Vladimir Putin took office. In the 
months that preceded his decision to renounce the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, 
defense-industry lobbyists and Iranian officials had expressed interest in resuming arms 
sales to Iran and others. When Putin consolidated the defense-export industry and placed 
two former KGB colleagues in executive-level positions, the military-industrial complex 
had inroads to Putin's policy-making process. And when Iranian officials announced that 
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they would begin a 25-year military-modernization plan that would feature mostly 
Russian weapons, systems, and tactics, Putin appears to have caved into interest-group 
pressure at home. Statements made by Kremlin officials cite legal, inter-national, and 
social reasons for resuming arms negotiations with Iran. But the most and most 
consistent statements concerned the obvious economic incentives for Russia's MIC. 
In December 2001, the first Russo-Iranian arms contract since the early 1990s 
was signed. However, it fell far short of Russian military-industrial and Iranian military-
politico expectations. Indeed, just one item on Khatami's "shopping list" had been 
delivered to Iran. Russian restraint, or perhaps Iranian financial woes may explain why 
only 20 or 21 helicopters were sold the following year. Available data does not indicate 
one or the other. However, in June 2001 and again in December 2001, reports emerged 
that the Kremlin was dissatisfied with Rosoboroneksport's performance, citing 
accounting problems, corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement. While the reports 
indicate that rent-seeking had taken place at Rosoboroneksport at the time of the Iranian 
Mi-171 deal, there is no conclusive or direct evidence to link rent-seeking with that deal. 
From 2002 through mid-2005, Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation 
cooled. The hype surrounding their new cooperation is said to have given way to Iranian 
financial woes, and Russian reluctance to provide Iran with newer, more advanced 
systems given their nuclear activities. However, there is no data available to draw 
conclusions on why Russo-Iranian MTC subsided during these years. In the summer of 
2005, Russia agreed to repair and upgrade Iran's three aging Kilo-class diesel-electric 
submarines, supposedly with the new Klub-S ASCM. However, it is not known if they 
have received the system. 
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In December 2005, following heated IAEA meetings concerning Iran's nuclear 
program, Russia announced plans to sell Iran 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORAD systems to 
defend its nuclear infrastructure. Given that the Tor-Mis had been on Khatami's list for 
nearly five years, the deal's timing and purpose suggest that the Kremlin had greater con-
trol of the defense industry and thus resisted their special-interest pressures to provide 
these and other, more capable systems. Indeed, "executive strength" factored into the 
Russo-Iranian MTC paradigm as an intervening variable, particularly in Putin's second 
term. Thus, in 2005 and 2006, he apparently used arms exports to Iran to further several 
of Russia's national interests, which included patronizing its defense industry, protecting 
its other investments in Iran (i.e., the Bushehr reactor complex), and strengthening 
security and stability in the Middle East. 
Despite Putin's apparent furthering of Russia's national interests via arms exports 
to Iran, the Tor-Mi deal involved an incestuous, patrimonial system in which former 
KGB colleagues are placed in high positions within the MIC and are allowed to seek 
rents from the process. Viktor Ivanov benefited personally from the Tor-Mi deal, since 
his company manufactured the systems. However, he had been at Almaz-Antei for 
nearly four years before the deal was approved, suggesting that Russia's national interests 
were of primary concern, while Ivanov's business interests were secondary. Thus, this 
study was unable to connect rent-seeking behaviors to Russo-Iranian arms contracts, even 
when MIC actors were pre-positioned, there were incentives, and there had been 
precedence to seek rents. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Summary of Findings 
Interest-Group Theory and Arms Exports to Iran 
This study found that the interest-group theory of government is partially applic-
able to Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran since 2000. The data presented 
shows that interest groups lobbied successfully to repeal the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agree-
ment in November 2000. There were international variables, such as the deal becoming 
public record in the U.S. and Iran's supposedly positive steps at home. However, the 
most prominent factor seemed to be the Russian defense industry interests and lobbying. 
This lobbying came in the form of both intra-governmental (i.e., bureaucratic) and extra-
governmental (i.e., economic and industrial) lobbying from the beginning of Putin's 
administration. They eventually won a modest renewal of military-technical cooperation 
with Iran. Thus, the hypothesis: (HI) If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then arms 
sales will increase, is strongly supported by this part of the case-study. 
However, beginning in 2002 and continuing through at least the beginning of 
2005, defense-industry interests and lobbying were much less successful in winning arms 
contracts with Iran, as the value and volume of their exports declined sharply to just $14 
million in 2004 and again in 2005. By then, it appears that Putin had sufficiently consol-
idated the defense-export industry, and thus, had sufficient executive power to control the 
MIC vis-a-vis Iranian demand for advanced, major conventional arms. By then, the Iran-
ian nuclear crisis was escalating, and though Iran would become Russia's third best 
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customer, it was not in Russia's interests to sell to Iran at the time. Thus, hypothesis: 
(HI) If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then arms sales will increase, is not 
supported by this part of the case-study. 
In late 2005, Putin appeared to turn the tables on the defense-industry, using the 
sale of 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORAD systems to Iran to further several Russian national 
interests. Certainly, strengthening the defense industry was one of them. But statements 
made by Russian and Iranian officials indicate that international variables were also at 
play: strengthening stability and security in the Middle East by protecting Iran's territory 
and infrastructure - i.e., deterring EU-3, Israeli, and/or U.S. military action. Further-
more, such a policy initiative reflects Russian executive power and state-autonomy vis-a-
vis decision-making. Iran had sought the Tor-Mi SHORAD systems for nearly five 
years, and the defense industry had sought to provide them and other, more advanced, 
capable, and costly systems. But Putin resisted both foreign and domestic pressure, and 
approved the deal only when it furthered Russian national interests, and without upsetting 
regional and international military balances. Thus, the hypothesis (HI) If interest groups 
lobby for arms sales, then arms sales will increase, is not supported by this part of the 
case-study. Interest-group lobbying did not appear to have a bearing on Putin's decision-
making; executive decision-making vis-a-vis international developments did. 
Thus, from 2007 on, interest-group theory proved either inapplicable or 
inconclusive. Nothing has come of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's call to ship the S-400 Triumf 
to Iran in September, and statements made by MIC officials indicate that neither Iran nor 
any other foreign country will acquire the advanced air-defense system any time soon. 
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen what - if anything — will come of the Su-30MKI, S-300 
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PMU-1, and Pantsyr-SIE deals. 
It is worth pointing out that beginning in 2005 and continuing through today, 
Putin consolidated his grip on other sectors of the Russian economy - notably, the energy 
and financial industries, and the media. By then, Yukos, once Russia's largest oil 
company, had been shut down and its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, imprisoned. Other 
so-called "oligarchs," like Boris Berezovsky (CEO of Sibneft, another oil company) and 
Vladimir Gusinsky, CEO of MediaMost, have since fled to London fearing a similar fate. 
Thus, Putin has pressured political enemies to move from the private industry and insert 
loyal friends and colleagues in their place in a de facto re-nationalization of industry. 
This has ensured that special-interest groups serve the state (or, at the very least, Putin 
and the Kremlin) before they serve themselves. Indeed, state-ownership and/or control of 
the media has gone a long way to serve these ends. 
Rent-Seeking and Arms Exports to Iran 
While interest-group theory was partially-applicable to the case-study, it was not 
able to reveal rampant rent-seeking by Kremlin and defense-industrial officials in the 
context of the Russo-Iranian relationship. It revealed a couple of instances in mid- and 
late-2001 when corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement were undermining Roso-
boroneksport's performance in the defense-export industry. While this supports Stephen 
J. Blank's general argument concerning the defense-export monopoly, there was no avail-
able data to connect these business practices with Russia's defense contracts with Iran. 
Likewise, the Russo-Iranian deal for 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORADs in December 
2005 suggests, but does not link, rent-seeking with Russia's military-technical relations 
with Iran. Though Viktor Ivanov had close personal and professional connections with 
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Putin, who had appointed him to Almaz-Antei in 2002, it does not appear that Ivanov 
used them to lobby him or his subordinates for the deal. Or if he had, he was not success-
ful, as the Tor-Mis were on Iran's wish-list for nearly five years before Putin allowed 
them to be exported. Thus, Ivanov was in a position to benefit from his company's sale 
of the air-defense systems, but was only able to when Putin approved the sale. Thus, the 
hypothesis (H2): If interest groups seek rents from arms sales, then arms sales will 
increase, is not supported by this part of the case-study. 
Recommendations for Future Studies 
In light of this case-study's findings, future studies could measure Russo-Iranian 
military-technical cooperation several different ways. Working at the domestic level, 
future studies could apply any one of several theories to the same case-study, such as 
corporate, elite, and rent-seeking theories. The nature of Russia's defense- and defense-
export industries is such that they are entirely state-owned and controlled, resembling not 
independent entities under a capitalist system, but de facto government bureaus staffed 
with loyal government apparatchiks. Thus, future studies could apply corporate, or 
corporatist theory to this case-study to determine if it more accurately and consistently 
describes, explains, and perhaps predicts Russian foreign military assistance to Iran. 
Also, since those in charge of the defense-export process appear to mostly origin-
ate from the KGB or one of its post-Cold War successors (e.g., the FSB, SVR), Russia's 
post-Cold War defense-export system appears to be militocratic, or elitist. Thus, future 
studies could apply elite theory, or a similar theory to determine if who you are, where 
you came from, and if you served the state have any bearing on Russia's defense-exports, 
particularly to problematic regimes-states like Iran. Perhaps those with security service 
76 
back-grounds who grew up with an anti-American, anti-Western Weltanschauung, and 
view arms sales to their enemies as a way to undermine their interests are more likely to 
continue to fight yester-year's wars with yester-year's tactics. 
Moreover, future studies could apply the rent-seeking theory, itself, to Russian-
Iranian military-technical cooperation. Recall that this study applied the interest-group 
theory to Blank's analysis of the Russian defense industry hoping to illuminate interest-
group lobbying as well as rent-seeking within Russia's defense-exports to Iran. But it 
was only able to uncover the former, and only in the beginning of Moscow and Tehran's 
renewed relationship. Thus, future studies could seek to uncover the effects of that 
lobbying (i.e., the parasitic rent-seeking and granting). This would perhaps be the hardest 
theory to apply to the case-study, for two reasons. 
First, since rent-seeking theory measures the effects of lobbying, it would almost 
certainly have to move from a political to a financial analysis. It would have to analyze 
myriad variables, including whether companies were selling at discount, market, or prem-
ium prices; their yearly profits; percentage of profits sent to state coffers, legally or 
illegally held as profits, reinvested in the company, used to buy up other companies, or 
spent on over-head. It would also have to investigate claims of bribes, kickbacks, extor-
tion, and myriad other unscrupulous business activities that go on behind closed doors. 
Also, the nature of defense industries in capitalist economies makes it difficult to 
discern between companies and governments exporting arms to further their national or 
special interests — be they bureaucratic, economic, ideological, tactical, and so on. 
Accusations of rent-seeking and -granting are not just applicable to the Russo-Iranian 
case-study. Who in Venezuela needs 24 Su-30MKI fighter-bombers? Will 24 new F-16 
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C/Ds really help Pakistan fight the GWOT? Why does South Korea buy arms from 
Russia and the U.S.? Arms purchases can be justified in more ways than they can be 
used; and not just abroad. Corruption and rent-seeking have also rocked the U.S. 
government in recent years, with Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham convicted of 
taking bribes and gifts from defense contractors in exchange for Pentagon contracts. 
Beyond the domestic level, future studies could also look at the Russo-Iranian 
military-technical relationship at the international level. Indeed, Russian policy-makers 
consistently defined Russia's overall policy vis-a-vis Iran in terms of geopolitical interest 
- security, stability, commerce, energy, and mutual protection from outside forces (i.e., 
NATO, Turkey, and the U.S.). While this study granted these factors, it did not examine 
them closely. Thus, future studies could look at the Iranian nuclear crisis, NATO expan-
sion, insurgencies in the Caucuses and Central Asia, and even the GWOT as potential 
drivers of Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation. 
Recommendations for U.S. Policy Makers 
Unfortunately, the U.S. government has limited countermeasures when addressing 
Russian foreign military assistance to Iran. Moscow has already violated and withdrawn 
from a key bilateral arms control agreement with the U.S. - the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Agreement - which critics say never had the status of a legally-binding international 
treaty anyway. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control agreements already exist, such as 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the various 
UN Security Council Resolutions which prohibit arms trading with Iran. However, 
experience has shown that Moscow circumvents or flouts nonproliferation measures 
while it pays lip-service to international security and stability. Experience has also 
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shown that Moscow pays little-to-no regard to U.S. legislation prohibiting arms deals 
with Iran, and has taken steps to ensure that its companies' commercial dealings with 
U.S. companies are not affected by U.S. government-imposed sanctions. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. government should follow a four-dimensional approach to 
counter Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran.262 First, it should continue to 
point to Russia's commitments to nonproliferation and international security, particularly 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When its actions appear to diverge 
from its commitments, U.S. officials should resort to "the politics of shame" and call 
Moscow out on its actions. Second, it should then sanction Russian firms, citizens, and 
institutes suspected of selling, loaning, leasing, or otherwise providing any form of mil-
itary assistance to Iran. Perhaps the reason why President Putin has exercised relative 
restraint in Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran is the notion that he and his 
administration will inevitably be criticized and his colleague's companies sanctioned by 
Washington, even if the U.S. is the world's number one arms dealer. 
Third, U.S. officials and policy-makers should attempt to find common ground 
with Russia on the Iranian nuclear issue, beyond the IAEA and UN Security Council. 
Washington should understand that Moscow does not want to see Iran acquire nuclear 
weapons either; but it does not share Western concern vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear activities. 
Russia has a complex, interdependent relationship with Iran: they are diplomatic, econ-
omic, political and strategic partners with shared security concerns. Thus, it does not 
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make sense for Iran to bite the hand that feeds it, builds its nuclear reactors, and equips its 
military. Perhaps the only reason why Russia does not want to see Iran develop a nuclear 
weapon is that it fears an Israeli or U.S. military response.263 Even a brief conflict in Iran 
would be too close for Russia's comfort, which is already threatened by eastern NATO 
expansion, a proposed missile defense shield in Poland the Czech Republic, and conflicts 
in the Caucuses and Central Asia. Indeed, given the West's hubris and saber-rattling, and 
Jerusalem and Washington's precedence for launching preventative military action on 
suspected WMD states, Moscow's fears are real. 
Thus, the U.S. should assure Russia that it, along with the EU-3 and the UN are 
committed to resolving the issue peacefully and diplomatically. It should also inform 
Israel of this renewed and strengthened diplomatic course, and assure it that while the 
U.S. is committed to peacefully resolving the nuclear crisis, it will not tolerate unilateral 
military action by either Iran or Israel. U.S. officials could threaten to withhold Peace 
Marble military aid packages to Israel if Jerusalem were to defect, hunt the hare, and 
sabotage the diplomatic process. Collectively, such measures should assuage Moscow's 
need to protect its investments in Iran, as well as prevent a third war from breaking out in 
its proverbial back yard. 
Finally, the U.S. military should quietly prepare to exercise the military option. 
By most accounts, the military option is a nearly no-win scenario, as it is debatable 
whether any air-strike could neutralize the Iranian nuclear program. Iranian leaders 
learned from the 1991 Persian Gulf War and built many of their nuclear facilities under-
ground and/or hardened them with layered steel and reinforced concrete. With precision-
Eugene B. Rumer, Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin (London: Routledge, 2007), 38. 
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guided, blinker-busting bombs dropped from high altitudes, many of Iran's facilities 
would be severely damaged or destroyed; but they could always be rebuilt. Moreover, 
the engineers and technicians who harbor the most vital components of all — the expertise 
- could be relocated at a moment's notice and would live to build another day. 
Meanwhile, the action would cause Iran's moderate, pro-Western citizens and 
leaders to radicalize, rally around the mullahs, and ultimately undo decades of progress 
made by internal and external leaders to improve relations with the West. Furthermore, 
given Iran's vows to retaliate with "the oil weapon," the West might then be cut off from 
25-40% of the world's oil, sending its economies further into recession and its govern-
ments into panic mode. Also, Israeli cities and/or U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the 
Middle East would likely be targeted with Iran's ballistic missiles, while U.S. cities and 
global assets would also be targeted by asymmetrical means. Lastly, Israel and/or the 
U.S. would draw the ire of the world, further chastening their diplomatic maneuvering. 
The military option would be a nightmare scenario, whether the U.S. or Israel 
exercised it. Thus, it should be the U.S. government's last resort. However, should dip-
lomatic efforts fail, the above scenario would still be better than Washington or Jerusalem 
dissolving beneath a fiery mushroom cloud, with hundreds of thousands or millions dead. 
So while the IAEA, UN, and the U.S. State Department work to diplomatically resolve 
the crisis, the U.S. military should still prepare for the military option. 
In preparation for an air campaign and in an attempt to counter years of Russian 
help in rebuilding Iran's air defenses, the U.S. Air Force and Navy should acquire Soviet/ 
Russian air-defense systems through FSU Republics and allies with such systems. They 
should adjust their electronic countermeasures (ECM) and prepare for the suppression of 
81 
enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission in order to facilitate safe ingress to targets. Also, in 
order to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, the U.S. Navy should prepare to hunt, track, and 
kill Iran's 3 Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines, and interdict mine-layers and/or 
missile patrol boats. To counter the ballistic missile threat, U.S. forces should position 
Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile batteries in Kuwait, Iraq, and Israel (if they have not 
already been placed there). Furthermore, it should position at least one of its sea-based 
missile-defense plat-forms inside the Persian Gulf in order to "layer" its missile defenses 




Appendix A: Major Russian Conventional Arms Transfers to Iran: 1989-2007 
























MiG-29A Fulcrum multi-role fighter 
aircraft 
Su-24MK Fencer fighter-bomber 
S-200BE (SA-5 Gammon) fixed air 
defense system 
877EKM/A7/o-class diesel electric 
submarine 
T-72S Main Battle Tank (MBT) 
BMP-2 armed infantry fighting vehicle 
(IFV) 
9MIII (AT-4 Spigot) ATGM 
V-46 Diesel Engine (AV) 
AA-8 Aphid and AA-10 Alamo air-to-air 
missiles (AAM) 
9M14M (AT-3 Sagger) ATGM 
D-30 122 MM towed artillery gun 
Mi-8/17 Hip-H multi-role helicopter 
9M113 (AT-5 Spandrel) ATGM 
9M114 (AT-6 Spiral) ATGM 
Mi-171Sh Hip Multi-role helicopter 
Mi-171Sh Hip Multi-role helicopter 
Su-25 close air-support (CAS) fighter-
ground attack (FGA) aircraft 
Kilo submarine upgrades; possibly with 
Klub-S (SS-N-27 Sizzler) ASCM 
MiG-29 and Su-24 upgrades 
Tor-Mi (SA-15 Gauntlet) mobile, short-
range air defense system 
9K331 (SA-15 Gauntlet) low-to-medium 
altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) short-range air-to-air 
missile (SRAAM)s 


























Delivery completed in 1994 
Delivery completed in 1994 
Delivery completed in 1994; unknown 
number of 5N62 missiles transferred; 
domestic production underway 
Delivery completed in 1996 
Local production began in 1993; 826 
procured as of 2006 
Local production began in 1993; 800 
procured as of 2006 
Delivery began in 1993; 9,750 delivered 
as of 2006 
For Russian T-54/5, and Chinese Type 
59 MBTs; Delivery completed in 2000 
To arm MiG-29s 
Delivery began in 1996; 2750 delivered 
as of 2006 
Delivered between 1998 and 2002 
For Search and Rescue (SAR); Delivery 
completed in 2000 
Delivery began in 1999; 1400 delivered 
as of 2006 
Delivered between 2000 and 2003 
Some intended for SAR; Delivery 
completed between 2000 and 2001 
Delivered between 2002 and 2003 
Delivery completed between 2003 and 
2006; 3 Su-25UBK and 3 Su-25T 
As of 2005, one upgraded; no evidence 
that Klub-S has been installed/transferred 
$700 million (part of $1.4 billion deal) 
Deliveries began by November/ 
December 2006; Completed by 2007 
Deliveries began by November/ 
December 2006; Completed by 2007 
Delivered 2006; to arm ex-Iraqi Air 
Force and newly-acquired Su-25s 
To outfit/upgrade U.S.-made F-5s and 
Iranian variants (Azarakhsh & Saeqeh) 
Most of this diagram is from Tor Bukkvoll's article, "Arming the Ayatollahs." All other additions are 
from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, "Iranian Imports," Generated June 11, 2007. 
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Appendix B: Russian Entities Suspected of Assisting Iran's Ballistic Missile Program -
1997-1998265 
Entity 
Baltic State Technical University 
Bauman Technical University 
Europalas 2000 
Federal Security Service (FSB) 
Glavkosmos 
Grafit Research Institute 
INOR Scientific Centre 
Kominterm Plant (Novosibirsk) 
MOSO Company 
Moscow Aviation Institute 
NPO Energomash 
NPO Trud 
Polyus Science and Research 
Russian Space Agency 






Training of Iranian personnel 
Training of Iranian personnel 
Attempted transfer of special 
steel via Azerbaijan 
Facilitated travel of Russian 
specialists to Iran _j 
Transferred dual-use missile 
production technology 
Transferred graphite ablative 
materials to Iran 
Transferred special mirrors, 
composite materials, foils, and 
metals to Iran 
Missile specialists traveled to Iran 
under false documents 
Attempted transfer of special 
steel via Azerbaijan 
Training of Iranian personnel 
Transferred SS-4 engine 
technology 
Transferred engine components, 
documentation, and engine test 
equipment; contracted to 
manufacture engine turbo pumps 
Transferred missile guidance 
technology and assisted with 
design of Shahab-3 guidance 
package 
According to Israeli Intelligence, 
Director Yuri Koptev facilitated 
technology transfers 
According to Israeli intelligence, 
recruited Russians to assist 
Iranians and facilitated several 
technology transfers 
Unclear 
Contracted to build wind tunnel; 
transferred model 1998) 
Action Taken 
Denied US funding (March 
1998), sanctioned by the United 
States (July 1998) 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998) 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998) 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998) 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998), restrictions lifted 
(April 2000) 
Suspicions not substantiated, 
sanctions not imposed 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998) 
Denied US funding (March 1998) 
sanctioned by the United States 
(January 1999) 
Suspicions not substantiated 
Lattermost effort thwarted; no 
recent signs of activity with Iran 
Sanctioned by the United States 
(July 1998), restrictions lifted 
(April 2000) 
Suspicions not substantiated, 
sanctions not imposed 
Denied US funding (March 1998) 
no recent signs of activity with 
Iran 
Col. Eas Bokhari (ret.), "Russian Arms & Technology transfers to Iran," defencejournal.com, 
http://www.defenceiounial.com/200l/august/russians.htm (accessed July 29, 2008). 
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Appendix C: Acronyms 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile 
CAS Close Air-Support 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CMTC Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States 
COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control 
ECM Electronic Countermeasures 
EU European Union 
FMA Foreign Military Assistance 
FSB Russian Federal Security Service 
FSU Former Soviet Union Republic 
FS VTS Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Court 
IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
KGB Committee for State Security (English Translation) 
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense System 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MIC Military-Industrial Complex 
MiG Mikoyan-Gurevich (Russian Aerospace Company) 
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 
MTC Military-Technical Cooperation 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
P-5 Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council 
R&D Research and Development 
SAM Surface-to-Air-Missile 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SHORAD Short-Range Air-Defense System 
SLV Satellite Launch Vehicle 
Su Sukhoi (Russian Aerospace Company) 
SRAAM Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
SVR Russian Foreign Intelligence Service 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UN United Nations 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
USA United States of America 
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